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(Non)Regulable avoidance and the perils of punishment

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Author Info
Jacob Nussim ()
Avraham Tabbach ()
Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10657-008-9045-y
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 25 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 191-208
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:25:y:2008:i:3:p:191-208

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100264

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: Crime; Punishment; Regulation; Avoidance; K14; K42;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "A Reason for Quantity Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 431-435, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Ehrlich, Isaac, 1973. "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 521-65, May-June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Timothy Stanley, 1995. "Optimal Penalties for Concealment of Crime," Law and Economics 9507001, EconWPA, revised 27 Dec 1995. [Downloadable!]
  5. Innes, Robert, 2001. "Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 239-56, April.
  6. Arun S. Malik, 1990. "Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(3), pages 341-353, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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