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Conceptions of property rights and norms

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  • Derek Yonai

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Derek Yonai, 2007. "Conceptions of property rights and norms," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 161-176, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:18:y:2007:i:3:p:161-176
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-007-9021-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Larry Samuelson, 1998. "Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262692198, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Property rights; Social norms; Law and economics; Legal history; K00; K11;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law

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