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The Success of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm Under Heterogenous Preferences with Endogenous Aspirations

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  • Ismail Saglam

    (TOBB University of Economics and Technology)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a one-to-one matching model with two phases; an adolescence phase where individuals meet a number of dates and learn about their aspirations, followed by a matching phase where individuals are matched according to a version of Gale and Shapley’s (Am Math Mon 69:9–15, 1962) deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm. Using simulations of this model, we study how the likelihoods of matching and divorce, and also the balancedness and the speed of matching associated with the outcome of the DA algorithm are affected by the size of correlation in the preferences of individuals and by the frequency individuals update their aspirations in the adolescence phase.

Suggested Citation

  • Ismail Saglam, 2021. "The Success of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm Under Heterogenous Preferences with Endogenous Aspirations," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 57(2), pages 577-591, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:compec:v:57:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s10614-020-09969-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10614-020-09969-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Ismail Saglam, 2020. "Measuring external stability in one-to-one matching," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(1), pages 234-247.
    2. Saglam, Ismail, 2019. "Measuring the External Stability of the One-to-One Matching Generated by the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm," MPRA Paper 91472, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mate search; One-to-one matching; Stability; Agent-based simulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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