Simple heuristics as equilibrium strategies in mutual sequential mate search
AbstractIn this paper, we study whether simple heuristics can arise as equilibrium strategies in mutual sequential mate search. To this aim, we extend the mate search model of Todd and Miller (1999), involving an adolescence (learning) phase followed by an actual mating phase, to a strategic game where the players, as the individuals in the mating population, choose before starting the adolescence phase, the best rule - among the four available search (aspiration adjustment) rules - to maximize their likelihood of mating, given the choice of other individuals. Conducting Monte Carlo simulations, we show that the use of the Take the Next Best Rule by the whole population never becomes a (Nash) equilibrium in the simulation range of adolescence lengths. While the unanimous use of the Adjust Relative Rule by the whole population arises as an equilibrium for a wide part of the simulation range, especially for medium to high adolescence lengths, the rules Adjust Up/Down and Adjust Relative/2 are unanimously chosen as equilibrium strategies for a small part of the simulation range and only when the adolescence is long and short, respectively.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 44222.
Date of creation: 24 Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Mate Choice; Mate Search; Simple Heuristics; Agent-Based Simulation; Stability; Equilibrium Strategies;
Other versions of this item:
- Ismail Saglam, 2014. "Simple Heuristics as Equilibrium Strategies in Mutual Sequential Mate Search," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 17(1), pages 12.
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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