Does licensing increase the quality of services? This is a major unresolved question in the economic analysis of occupational licensing. This paper provides the first empirical evidence on the simultaneous relationship between anticompetitive effects and minimal quality standards. Using data on real estate agents, we find that restrictions on entry improve the quality of services (by lowering complaints), but, at the same time, there appear to be significant anticompetitive side-effects.
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