Wie lässt sich die Zulassungsinformation der Studieninteressenten verbessern?
AbstractThe politics of intensifying competition in higher education by deregulation and decentralisation caused in Germany problems in the field of college admissions. In the case of excess demand high transaction costs and inefficient allocation resulted from multiple applications. In a decentralized matching market the number of these applications could be reduced by increasing the number of those prospective applicants which are able to calculate their chance of admission as nearly certain or as almost without a prospect.Of special interest for this calculation are the percentage of accepted applicants and the cut off grades of the admissions procedures in the past. A cut off grade will be the more suitable for the purpose of prognosis as the applicant can foresee her or his own performance (e.g. assessed with points) in the admission procedure; and if it can be stated to which extent the cut off grade will react to varying numbers of applicants. The universities should be obliged to publish the relevant key figures, and they should abstain from selection procedures causing high uncertainty to the applicant‘s endeavours for prognosis.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics in its journal Journal of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): 229 (2009)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
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More information through EDIRC
College admission; matching;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
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- Stephen L. DeJardins & Dennis A. Ahlburg & Brian McCall, . "An Integrated Model of Application, Admission, Enrollment, and Financial Aid," Working Papers 0104, Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus).
- Joana Pais, 2006.
"Random Matching in the College Admissions Problem,"
Working Papers Department of Economics
2006/13, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, University of Lisbon.
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- Roth, Alvin E & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1989. "The College Admissions Problem Revisited," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 559-70, May.
- Rothschild, Michael & White, Lawrence J, 1995. "The Analytics of the Pricing of Higher Education and Other Services in Which the Customers Are Inputs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 573-86, June.
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