Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Die Ausgestaltung von Versorgungsvertraegen: Eine vertragstheoretische Analyse

Contents:

Author Info

  • Axel Muehlbacher

    ()
    (Hochschule Neubrandenburg)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Transaction costs are an obstacle to the efficient operation of selective contracting. Health care delivery systems (§140 a-d SGB V) and selective contracting between networks of service providers and purchasers are advocated as an effective method to improve the performance of the German health care system. The problems of measurability, motivation associated with specific production of health care services forms a stronger regulatory environment. Contracting mechanisms should be analysed before purchasers can rely on obtaining these services from the selective contracting sector. This paper focuses on the theories from new institutional economics to analyze the policies of competitive contracting in the presence of asymmetric information, uncertainty and the inability to write complete contingent contracts. It is crucial, that both parties agree on the avoidance of endogenous risks and the procedures with unforeseeable contingencies (exogenous risks). Strategic behavior because of moral hazard and hold up situations is referred to endogenous risk. Uncertainty based on contingency, error and change of utilization are identified as exogenous risks. In order to control these risks structured renegotiations and risk-sharing and shared-saving arrangements should be scheduled.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.wiso-net.de/webcgi?START=A60&DOKV_DB=ZECO&DOKV_NO=JFNSJFNS2008040076513181410302816142&DOKV_HS=0&PP=1
    File Function: Main text
    Download Restriction: Access via GENIOS - German Business Information - http://www.genios.de/r_startseite/index.ein

    File URL: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0982749&site=ehost-live
    File Function: Main text
    Download Restriction: Access via EBSCOhost Econlit - http://www.ebscohost.com/

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics in its journal Journal of Economics and Statistics.

    Volume (Year): 227 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 5+6 (December)
    Pages: 765-786

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:227:y:2007:i:5-6:p:765-786

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Licher Straße 74, 35394 Gießen
    Phone: +49 (0)641 99 22 001
    Fax: +49 (0)641 99 22 009
    Web page: http://wiwi.uni-giessen.de/home/oekonometrie/Jahrbuecher/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Delivery of health care; integrated health care delivery systems; selective contracting; risks; methods; transactioncost; contract theory; principal-agent theory; incomplete contracts;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1990. "Optimal payment systems for health services," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 375-396, December.
    2. Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, 1993. "Supply-Side and Demand-Side Cost Sharing in Health Care," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 135-151, Fall.
    3. Hardman Moore, John & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 60, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
    5. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December.
    6. Selden, Thomas M., 1990. "A model of capitation," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 397-409, December.
    7. Mathias Dewatripont & Philippe Aghion & Patrick Rey, 1994. "Renegotiation design with unverifiable information," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9591, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    8. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1994. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," Scholarly Articles 12375014, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    9. Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1991. "Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(5), pages 1031-42, October.
    10. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:227:y:2007:i:5-6:p:765-786. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Winker).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.