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Agent Competition Double-Auction Mechanism

Author

Listed:
  • Leon Yang Chu

    (Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089)

  • Zuo-Jun Max Shen

    (Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720)

Abstract

This paper proposes an agent competition double-auction mechanism to simplify decision making and promote transactions for the customer-to-customer marketplaces. Under the proposed double-auction mechanism, bidding one's true valuation (private information) is the best strategy for each individual buyer and seller even when shipping costs and sales taxes are different across various possible transactions. The proposed mechanism also achieves budget balance and asymptotic efficiency. Furthermore, these results not only hold for an environment where buyers and sellers exchange identical commodities, but also can be extended to an environment with multiple substitutable commodities.

Suggested Citation

  • Leon Yang Chu & Zuo-Jun Max Shen, 2006. "Agent Competition Double-Auction Mechanism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(8), pages 1215-1222, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:52:y:2006:i:8:p:1215-1222
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0528
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Babaioff, Moshe & Nisan, Noam & Pavlov, Elan, 2009. "Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 660-684, July.
    2. Leon Yang Chu, 2009. "Truthful Bundle/Multiunit Double Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(7), pages 1184-1198, July.
    3. Xiao, Haohan & Xu, Meng & Yang, Hai, 2020. "Pricing strategies for shared parking management with double auction approach: Differential price vs. uniform price," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    4. Xiao, Haohan & Xu, Meng & Gao, Ziyou, 2018. "Shared parking problem: A novel truthful double auction mechanism approach," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 40-69.
    5. Kong, Xiang T.R. & Kang, Kai & Zhong, Ray Y. & Luo, Hao & Xu, Su Xiu, 2021. "Cyber physical system-enabled on-demand logistics trading," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 233(C).
    6. Cheng, Meng & Xu, Su Xiu & Huang, George Q., 2016. "Truthful multi-unit multi-attribute double auctions for perishable supply chain trading," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 21-37.
    7. Blume, Lawrence E. & Easley, David & Kleinberg, Jon & Tardos, Éva, 2009. "Trading networks with price-setting agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 36-50, September.
    8. Leon Yang Chu & Zuo-Jun Max Shen, 2008. "Truthful Double Auction Mechanisms," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 56(1), pages 102-120, February.
    9. Bahbouhi, Jalal Eddine & Moussa, Najem, 2017. "Prisoner’s dilemma game model for e-commerce," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 292(C), pages 128-144.
    10. Sun, Jiasen & Li, Guo & Xu, Su Xiu & Dai, Wei, 2019. "Intermodal transportation service procurement with transaction costs under belt and road initiative," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 31-48.
    11. Yu, Hao & Huang, Min & Chao, Xiuli & Yue, Xiaohang, 2022. "Truthful multi-attribute multi-unit double auctions for B2B e-commerce logistics service transactions," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).
    12. Guo, Jiantao & Zhang, Juliang & Cheng, T.C.E. & Zhao, Shouting, 2022. "Truthful double auction mechanisms for online freight platforms with transaction costs," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 164-186.
    13. Xu, Su Xiu & Cheng, Meng & Huang, George Q., 2015. "Efficient intermodal transportation auctions for B2B e-commerce logistics with transaction costs," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 322-337.
    14. Bin Hu & Anyan Qi, 2018. "Optimal Procurement Mechanisms for Assembly," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 20(4), pages 655-666, October.
    15. Jiasen Sun & Guo Li, 2020. "Designing a double auction mechanism for the re-allocation of emission permits," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 291(1), pages 847-874, August.

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