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Software Assistants for Randomized Patrol Planning for the LAX Airport Police and the Federal Air Marshal Service

Author

Listed:
  • Manish Jain

    (Computer Science Department, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089)

  • Jason Tsai

    (Computer Science Department, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089)

  • James Pita

    (Computer Science Department, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089)

  • Christopher Kiekintveld

    (Computer Science Department, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089)

  • Shyamsunder Rathi

    (Computer Science Department, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089)

  • Milind Tambe

    (Computer Science Department, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089)

  • Fernando Ordóñez

    (Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089; and Department of Industrial Engineering, University of Chile, 8330111 Santiago, Chile)

Abstract

The increasing threat of terrorism makes security at major locations of economic or political importance a major concern. Limited security resources prevent complete security coverage, allowing adversaries to observe and exploit patterns in patrolling or monitoring, and enabling them to plan attacks that avoid existing patrols. The use of randomized security policies that are more difficult for adversaries to predict and exploit can counter their surveillance capabilities. We describe two applications, ARMOR and IRIS, that assist security forces in randomizing their operations. These applications are based on fast algorithms for solving large instances of Bayesian Stackelberg games. Police at the Los Angeles International Airport deploy ARMOR to randomize the placement of checkpoints on roads entering the airport and the routes of canine unit patrols within the airport terminals. The Federal Air Marshal Service has deployed IRIS in a pilot program to randomize the schedules of air marshals on international flights. This paper examines the design choices, information, and evaluation criteria that were critical to developing these applications.

Suggested Citation

  • Manish Jain & Jason Tsai & James Pita & Christopher Kiekintveld & Shyamsunder Rathi & Milind Tambe & Fernando Ordóñez, 2010. "Software Assistants for Randomized Patrol Planning for the LAX Airport Police and the Federal Air Marshal Service," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 40(4), pages 267-290, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:orinte:v:40:y:2010:i:4:p:267-290
    DOI: 10.1287/inte.1100.0505
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Karwowski, Jan & Mańdziuk, Jacek, 2019. "A Monte Carlo Tree Search approach to finding efficient patrolling schemes on graphs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 277(1), pages 255-268.
    2. Chen, Shun & Zhao, Xudong & Chen, Zhilong & Hou, Benwei & Wu, Yipeng, 2022. "A game-theoretic method to optimize allocation of defensive resource to protect urban water treatment plants against physical attacks," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 36(C).
    3. Guzman, Cristobal & Riffo, Javiera & Telha, Claudio & Van Vyve, Mathieu, 2021. "A Sequential Stackelberg Game for Dynamic Inspection Problems," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2021036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Casorrán, Carlos & Fortz, Bernard & Labbé, Martine & Ordóñez, Fernando, 2019. "A study of general and security Stackelberg game formulations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 278(3), pages 855-868.
    5. Chao Zhang & Shahrzad Gholami & Debarun Kar & Arunesh Sinha & Manish Jain & Ripple Goyal & Milind Tambe, 2016. "Keeping Pace with Criminals: An Extended Study of Designing Patrol Allocation against Adaptive Opportunistic Criminals," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(3), pages 1-27, June.
    6. Nicholas Scurich & Richard S. John, 2014. "Perceptions of Randomized Security Schedules," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 34(4), pages 765-770, April.
    7. Guzmán, Cristóbal & Riffo, Javiera & Telha, Claudio & Van Vyve, Mathieu, 2022. "A sequential Stackelberg game for dynamic inspection problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 302(2), pages 727-739.
    8. Beck, Yasmine & Ljubić, Ivana & Schmidt, Martin, 2023. "A survey on bilevel optimization under uncertainty," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 311(2), pages 401-426.
    9. Nishizaki, Ichiro & Hayashida, Tomohiro & Sekizaki, Shinya & Okabe, Junya, 2022. "Data envelopment analysis approaches for two-level production and distribution planning problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 300(1), pages 255-268.
    10. Tomohiro Hayashida & Ichiro Nishizaki & Shinya Sekizaki & Junya Okabe, 2023. "Data Envelopment Analysis Approaches for Multiperiod Two-Level Production and Distribution Planning Problems," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(21), pages 1-25, October.
    11. Hoong Chuin Lau & Zhi Yuan & Aldy Gunawan, 2016. "Patrol scheduling in urban rail network," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 239(1), pages 317-342, April.
    12. Yan, Xihong & Ren, Xiaorong & Nie, Xiaofeng, 2022. "A budget allocation model for domestic airport network protection," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 82(PB).
    13. Tamara Stotz & Angela Bearth & Signe Maria Ghelfi & Michael Siegrist, 2020. "Evaluating the Perceived Efficacy of Randomized Security Measures at Airports," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(7), pages 1469-1480, July.
    14. Frederic Moisan & Cleotilde Gonzalez, 2017. "Security under Uncertainty : Adaptive Attackers Are More Challenging to Human Defenders than Random Attackers," Post-Print hal-03188217, HAL.
    15. Gianfranco Gambarelli & Daniele Gervasio & Francesca Maggioni & Daniel Faccini, 2022. "A Stackelberg game for the Italian tax evasion problem," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 295-307, June.

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