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Monetary Policy under Imperfect Commitment: Reconciling Theory with Evidence

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Author Info
A. Hakan Kara (Research and Monetary Policy Department Central Bank of Turkey)
Abstract

In the standard forward-looking models of the recent literature, theoretical optimal monetary policy rules imply much higher inertia of interest rates than estimated historical policy rules. Motivated by the observation that theoretical policy rules often assume perfect commitment on the part of the monetary authority, this study formulates the monetary policy behavior with a continuum from discretion to full commitment and, using this setup, seeks to match the theory with evidence. It is shown that optimal instrument rules under imperfect commitment exhibit less inertia on the policy instrument; the degree of inertia declines as the policy moves from full commitment to discretion. Therefore, under the assumption that the monetary authorities operate somewhere in between discretion and commitment, historically observed policy behavior can be reconciled with the optimal policy rules - even in a purely forward-looking framework. As a by-product, we propose a method to measure the stance of monetary policy from the perspective of discretion versus commitment. To test our proposal, we estimate a structural monetary policy rule for the Federal Reserve, which nests discretion and commitment as special cases. Empirical results suggest that recent practice of monetary policy has been closer to commitment than the policy pursued in the 1970s.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by International Journal of Central Banking in its journal International Journal of Central Banking.

Volume (Year): 3 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 149-178
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Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2007:q:1:a:5

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Julio J. Rotemberg & Michael Woodford, 1998. "An Optimization-Based Econometric Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy: Expanded Version," NBER Technical Working Papers 0233, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Glenn D. Rudebusch, 2001. "Is The Fed Too Timid? Monetary Policy In An Uncertain World," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(2), pages 203-217, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Michael Woodford, 1999. "Commentary : how should monetary policy be conducted in an era of price stability?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 277-316. [Downloadable!]
  4. A. Hakan Kara, 2004. "Optimal Monetary Policy, Commitment, and Imperfect Credibility," Central Bank Review, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, vol. 4(1), pages 31-66. [Downloadable!]
  5. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Jean Boivin & Marc Giannoni, 2002. "Has monetary policy become less powerful?," Staff Reports 144, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  7. Andrea Tambalotti & Ernst Schaumburg, 2004. "An Investigation of the Gains from Commitment in Monetary Policy," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 282, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Marc Paolo Giannoni & Michael Woodford, 2003. "How forward-looking is optimal monetary policy?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 1425-1483.
  9. Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Sack, Brian & Wieland, Volker, 2000. "Interest-rate smoothing and optimal monetary policy: a review of recent empirical evidence," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 52(1-2), pages 205-228. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Favero, Carlo A & Rovelli, Riccardo, 2003. " Macroeconomic Stability and the Preferences of the Fed: A Formal Analysis, 1961-98," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(4), pages 545-56, August.
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  12. Roberds, William, 1987. "Models of Policy under Stochastic Replanning," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 731-55, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Kenneth N. Kuttner & Adam S. Posen, 2007. "Do Markets Care Who Chairs the Central Bank?," NBER Working Papers 13101, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Moser, Christoph / Dreher, Axel, 2007. "Do Markets Care about Central Bank Governor Changes? Evidence from Emerging Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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