IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ijb/journl/v2y2003i3p213-226.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On Incentives for an Efficient Flow of Knowledge within Multinationals

Author

Listed:
  • Amir Shoham

    (Department of Business Administration, Ben-Gurion University, Israel and Negev Academic College of Engineering, Israel)

  • Varda Lewinstein Yaari

    (Department of Business Administration, Ben-Gurion University, Israel)

  • David M. Brock

    (Department of Business Administration, Ben-Gurion University, Israel)

Abstract

In this paper we develop a principal-agent, game-theoretic model of an MNC, intended to add to the understanding of how smart choices between incentives, monitoring, and structures are linked to an effective intra-firm flow of knowledge. We find that the equilibrium depends on the efficiency of substituting incentives for monitoring. Our study sheds light on arguments within the international management field about monitoring, incentives for managers, and managing knowledge transfer between subsidiaries.

Suggested Citation

  • Amir Shoham & Varda Lewinstein Yaari & David M. Brock, 2003. "On Incentives for an Efficient Flow of Knowledge within Multinationals," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 2(3), pages 213-226, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ijb:journl:v:2:y:2003:i:3:p:213-226
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ijbe.fcu.edu.tw/assets/ijbe/past_issue/No.02-3/pdf/vol_2-3-4.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://ijbe.fcu.edu.tw/assets/ijbe/past_issue/No.02-3/abstract/04.html
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
    2. Gupta, Anil K. & Govindarajan, V., 1994. "Organizing for knowledge flows within MNCs," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 443-457, December.
    3. Mohan Subramaniam & N. Venkatraman, 2001. "Determinants of transnational new product development capability: testing the influence of transferring and deploying tacit overseas knowledge," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 359-378, April.
    4. Foss, Nicolai J. & Pedersen, Torben, 2002. "Transferring knowledge in MNCs: The role of sources of subsidiary knowledge and organizational context," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 49-67.
    5. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    6. M Krishna Erramilli, 1996. "Nationality and Subsidiary Ownership Patterns in Multinational Corporations," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 27(2), pages 225-248, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Xing, Yijun & Liu, Yipeng & Tarba, Shlomo Yedidia & Cooper, Cary L., 2016. "Intercultural influences on managing African employees of Chinese firms in Africa: Chinese managers’ HRM practices," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 28-41.
    2. Jong-Shin Wei & Chwen-Chi Liu, 2003. "Structure, Conduct, and Performance of Principal-Agent Models: An Overview," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 2(3), pages 177-178, December.
    3. Ma, Danni & Fee, Anthony & Grabowski, Simone & Scerri, Moira, 2022. "Dual Organizational Identification in Multinational Enterprises and Interpersonal Horizontal Knowledge Sharing: A Conceptual Model," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 28(1).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Maria Adenfelt & Katarina Lagerström, 2008. "The development and sharing of knowledge by Centres of Excellence and transnational teams: A conceptual framework," Management International Review, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 319-338, May.
    2. Adenfelt, Maria & Lagerström, Katarina, 2006. "Knowledge development and sharing in multinational corporations: The case of a centre of excellence and a transnational team," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 381-400, August.
    3. Ambos, Tina C. & Ambos, Björn & Schlegelmilch, Bodo B., 2006. "Learning from foreign subsidiaries: An empirical investigation of headquarters' benefits from reverse knowledge transfers," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 294-312, June.
    4. Persson, Magnus, 2006. "The impact of operational structure, lateral integrative mechanisms and control mechanisms on intra-MNE knowledge transfer," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 547-569, October.
    5. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2018. "Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, chapter 16, pages 453-485, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Peltokorpi, Vesa, 2015. "Corporate Language Proficiency and Reverse Knowledge Transfer in Multinational Corporations: Interactive Effects of Communication Media Richness and Commitment to Headquarters," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 49-62.
    7. Ewerhart, Christian, 2016. "An envelope approach to tournament design," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 1-9.
    8. Ohad Kadan & Philip J. Reny & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2017. "Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal‐Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 769-823, May.
    9. Lang, Matthias, 2019. "Communicating subjective evaluations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 163-199.
    10. Martin Byford, 2003. "Moral Hazard From Costless Hidden Actions," Working Papers 2003.03, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
    11. Andrea Lodi & Enrico Malaguti & Nicolás E. Stier-Moses & Tommaso Bonino, 2016. "Design and Control of Public-Service Contracts and an Application to Public Transportation Systems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(4), pages 1165-1187, April.
    12. Dorra Yahiaoui & Hela Chebbi, 2008. "The limits of top-down transfers within a multinational corporation: the need for knowledge hybridization," Journal of Innovation Economics, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(2), pages 85-104.
    13. Matthias Lang, 2023. "Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(1), pages 104-134, March.
    14. Nahum D. Melumad, 1989. "Asymmetric information and the termination of contracts in agencies," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(2), pages 733-753, March.
    15. Ghossoub, Mario, 2010. "Supplement to "Belief heterogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv insurance model"," MPRA Paper 37717, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Mar 2012.
    16. Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2010. "Unobservable Persistent Productivity and Long Term Contracts," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(2), pages 333-349, April.
    17. C. Choe & I. Fraser, 1998. "A Note on Imperfect Monitoring of Agri‐Environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 250-258, June.
    18. Chade, Hector & Swinkels, Jeroen, 2020. "The moral hazard problem with high stakes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    19. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2014_002 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Garrett, Daniel F. & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023. "Optimal technology design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    21. Nadide Banu Olcay, 2016. "Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(4), pages 255-288, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    multinational; incentives; monitoring;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General
    • M20 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ijb:journl:v:2:y:2003:i:3:p:213-226. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Szu-Hsien Ho (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cbfcutw.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.