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On Incentives for an Efficient Flow of Knowledge within Multinationals

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  • Amir Shoham

    (Department of Business Administration, Ben-Gurion University, Israel and Negev Academic College of Engineering, Israel)

  • Varda Lewinstein Yaari

    (Department of Business Administration, Ben-Gurion University, Israel)

  • David M. Brock

    (Department of Business Administration, Ben-Gurion University, Israel)

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    Abstract

    In this paper we develop a principal-agent, game-theoretic model of an MNC, intended to add to the understanding of how smart choices between incentives, monitoring, and structures are linked to an effective intra-firm flow of knowledge. We find that the equilibrium depends on the efficiency of substituting incentives for monitoring. Our study sheds light on arguments within the international management field about monitoring, incentives for managers, and managing knowledge transfer between subsidiaries.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan in its journal International Journal of Business and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 2 (2003)
    Issue (Month): 3 (December)
    Pages: 213-226

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    Handle: RePEc:ijb:journl:v:2:y:2003:i:3:p:213-226

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    Web page: http://www.ijbe.org/
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    Related research

    Keywords: multinational; incentives; monitoring;

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    References

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    1. Foss, Nicolai J. & Pedersen, Torben, 2002. "Transferring knowledge in MNCs: The role of sources of subsidiary knowledge and organizational context," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 49-67.
    2. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    3. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-67, November.
    4. Gupta, Anil K. & Govindarajan, V., 1994. "Organizing for knowledge flows within MNCs," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 443-457, December.
    5. M Krishna Erramilli, 1996. "Nationality and Subsidiary Ownership Patterns in Multinational Corporations," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 27(2), pages 225-248, June.
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