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Optimización de la transferencia de riesgos en los Contratos de Infraestructuras y Servicios Públicos

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  • Antonio Sánchez Soliño

    ()
    (Universidad Politécnica de Madrid)

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    Abstract

    En este trabajo se desarrolla un modelo basado en la teoría de los incentivos para analizar la asignación optima de los riesgos en los contratos de infraestructuras y servicios públicos, en un entorno de información asimétrica entre principal (Administración Pública) y agente (socio privado), y de aversión al riesgo de este ultimo. La principal conclusión del trabajo es que, en un contrato optimo, la transferencia del riesgo de demanda al socio privado será mayor, frente al riesgo de disponibilidad, en la medida en que tengan mayor incidencia aquellas dimensiones de la calidad del servicio que puedan ser observadas por los usuarios pero no verificadas por la Administración. Clasificación JEL: D82, H54, H57, L97.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by IEF in its journal Hacienda Pública Española/Review of Public Economics.

    Volume (Year): 201 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 67-91

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    Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2012:v:201:i:2:p:67-91

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    Related research

    Keywords: Incentivos; riesgo de demanda; riesgo de disponibilidad; contratación pública; servicios públicos.;

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    1. Loeb, Martin & Magat, Wesley A, 1979. "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 399-404, October.
    2. Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2009. "The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector," CEDI Discussion Paper Series 09-04, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
    3. Arrow, K J & Radner, R, 1979. "Allocation of Resources in Large Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 361-85, March.
    4. Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2006. "'Build It or Not': Normative and Positive Theories of Public-Private Partnerships," CEPR Discussion Papers 5610, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Pilar Socorro, M., 2007. "Optimal technology policy under asymmetric information in a research joint venture," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 76-97, January.
    6. Juan Dolado, 1999. "A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability in Spain," NBER Chapters, in: The Costs and Benefits of Price Stability, pages 95-132 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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