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Costs and Consequences of Traffic Fines and Fees: A Case Study of Open Warrants in Las Vegas, Nevada

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  • Foster Kamanga

    (Department of Sociology, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, NV 89154-5033, USA)

  • Virginia Smercina

    (Department of Sociology, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, NV 89154-5033, USA)

  • Barbara G. Brents

    (Department of Sociology, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, NV 89154-5033, USA)

  • Daniel Okamura

    (Department of Sociology, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, NV 89154-5033, USA)

  • Vincent Fuentes

    (Department of Sociology, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, NV 89154-5033, USA)

Abstract

Traffic stops and tickets often have far-reaching consequences for poor and marginalized communities, yet resulting fines and fees increasingly fund local court systems. This paper critically explores who bears the brunt of traffic fines and fees in Nevada, historically one of the fastest growing and increasingly diverse states in the nation, and one of thirteen US states to prosecute minor traffic violations as criminal misdemeanors rather than civil infractions. Drawing on legislative histories, we find that state legislators in Nevada increased fines and fees to raise revenues. Using descriptive statistics to analyze the 2012–2020 open arrest warrants extracted from the Las Vegas Municipal Court, we find that 58.6% of all open warrants are from failure to pay tickets owing to administrative-related offenses—vehicle registration and maintenance, no license or plates, or no insurance. Those issued warrants for failure to pay are disproportionately for people who are Black and from the poorest areas in the region. Ultimately, the Nevada system of monetary traffic sanctions criminalizes poverty and reinforces racial disparities.

Suggested Citation

  • Foster Kamanga & Virginia Smercina & Barbara G. Brents & Daniel Okamura & Vincent Fuentes, 2021. "Costs and Consequences of Traffic Fines and Fees: A Case Study of Open Warrants in Las Vegas, Nevada," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 10(11), pages 1-25, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jscscx:v:10:y:2021:i:11:p:440-:d:683034
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, 2009. "Political Economy at Any Speed: What Determines Traffic Citations?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 509-527, March.
    5. Richard Tay, 2010. "Speed Cameras Improving Safety or Raising Revenue?," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 44(2), pages 247-257, May.
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