Political Economy at Any Speed: What Determines Traffic Citations?
AbstractSpeeding tickets are determined not only by the speed of the offender, but also by incentives faced by police officers and their vote-maximizing principals. We hypothesize that police officers issue fines more frequently when drivers have a higher opportunity cost of contesting a ticket, and when drivers are not residents of the local municipality. We also predict that local officers are more likely to issue a ticket to out-of-town drivers when fiscal conditions are tight and legal limits prevent increases in property taxes. Using data from traffic stops in Massachusetts, we find support for our hypotheses. (JEL H76, R41)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 99 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories
- R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Systems - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Delhaye, Eef & Proost, Stef & Rousseau, Sandra, 2007.
"Catching or fining speeders: A political economy approach,"
Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
urn:hdl:123456789/120459, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Eef Delhaye & Stef Proost & Sandra Rousseau, 2007. "Catching or fining speeders: a political economy approach," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0714, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
- Delhaye Eef & Proost Stef & Rousseau Sandra, 2007. "Catching or Fining Speeders: A Political Economy Approach," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0702, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
- Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, 2009.
"More Tickets, Fewer Accidents: How Cash-Strapped Towns Make for Safer Roads,"
2009-02, Towson University, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2009.
- Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, 2011. "More Tickets, Fewer Accidents: How Cash-Strapped Towns Make for Safer Roads," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(4), pages 863 - 888.
- Makowsky, Michael & Thomas, Stratmann, 2008. "More Tickets, Fewer Accidents: How Cash-Strapped Towns Make for Safer Roads," MPRA Paper 14360, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dara N. Lee, 2011. "Do Traffic Tickets Reduce Motor Vehicle Accidents? Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Working Papers 1119, Department of Economics, University of Missouri, revised 17 Jan 2012.
- Sarah Marx Quintanar, . "Do Driver Decisions in Traffic Court Motivate Police Discrimination in Issuing Speeding Tickets?," Departmental Working Papers 2011-13, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
- Hasebe, Takuya & Vijverberg, Wim P., 2012. "A Flexible Sample Selection Model: A GTL-Copula Approach," IZA Discussion Papers 7003, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Juergen Jung & Michael D. Makowsky, 2012. "Regulatory Enforcement, Politics, and Institutional Distance: OSHA Inspections 1990-2010," Working Papers 2012-02, Towson University, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2013.
- Sarah Marx Quintanar, . "Man vs. Machine: An Investigation of Speeding Ticket Disparities Based on Gender and Race," Departmental Working Papers 2009-16, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
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