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Behavior Strategy Analysis Based on the Multi-Stakeholder Game under the Plastic Straw Ban in China

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  • Tinggui Chen

    (School of Statistics and Mathematics, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China
    Academy of Zhejiang Culture Industry Innovation & Development, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China)

  • Yuling Zhang

    (School of Statistics and Mathematics, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China)

  • Jianjun Yang

    (Department of Computer Science and Information Systems, University of North Georgia, Oakwood, GA 30566, USA)

  • Guodong Cong

    (School of Tourism and Urban-Rural Planning, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China)

  • Guozhang Jiang

    (Hubei Key Laboratory of Mechanical Transmission and Manufacturing Engineering, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430081, China)

  • Gongfa Li

    (Key Laboratory of Metallurgical Equipment and Control Technology of Ministry of Education, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430081, China)

Abstract

Since 1 January 2021, China has banned nondegradable disposable straws in the catering industry. To promote the enforcement of the ban of plastic straws and improve the relationship between economic development and environmental protection, based on the evolutionary game method, this paper constructs the game model from the supply side and the demand side, respectively. Subsequently, through the dynamic equation, stable system evolution strategy is obtained. Furthermore, simulation is conducted to test the influence of the main parameters in the model on the evolution of system strategy. The results show that (1) the change of the government strategy mainly depends on its regulation costs and revenue, while the production strategy of a company is affected by the government and consumer strategies. (2) From the perspective of enterprise supply, government subsidies can promote technological innovation and develop new plastic straw substitutes. However, government penalties have little effect on violating enterprises. In addition, from the perspective of enterprise demand, with the collaboration of enterprises and consumers, it is easier for enterprises to carry out technological innovation. (3) Consumer acceptance of the substitutes for disposable plastic straws as well as online comments have a decisive influence on the enterprises’ selections for research and development (R&D) strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Tinggui Chen & Yuling Zhang & Jianjun Yang & Guodong Cong & Guozhang Jiang & Gongfa Li, 2021. "Behavior Strategy Analysis Based on the Multi-Stakeholder Game under the Plastic Straw Ban in China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(23), pages 1-33, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:18:y:2021:i:23:p:12729-:d:693698
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    References listed on IDEAS

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