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Public Information: Relevance or Salience?

Author

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  • Giovanna M. Invernizzi

    (Political Science Department, Columbia University, 420 W 118th St., New York, NY 10027, USA
    I would like to offer my special thanks to Alessandra Casella, Judd Kessler, Mark Dean, Silvio Ravaioli, Pietro Ortoleva and participants of the Experimental Economics Seminar at Columbia for valuable and constructive suggestions. I thank participants to seminars and conferences in Harvard HEWG, Princeton PE research group, SWEET New York, BMP Rice and EITM Summer Institute for their helpful comments.)

Abstract

How does salient public information affect voters’ behavior? In a majoritarian voting game with common preferences, rational voters could use public information as an information device (depending on accuracy) or as a coordination device (regardless of accuracy). A simple lab experiment contradicts both hypotheses – subjects tend to follow public information when it is salient, regardless of the information’s accuracy, but fail to use it as a source of coordination. In particular, it matters whether the information is recent – subjects are more likely to follow public information when it is provided closer to the voting decision. These findings are important because the salience of public information is easily manipulable by political actors.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanna M. Invernizzi, 2020. "Public Information: Relevance or Salience?," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-28, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:11:y:2020:i:1:p:4-:d:305512
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Gabriele Gratton & Galina Zudenkova, 2020. "Introduction to the Special Issue Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-2, February.

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