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The evidence on government competition

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  • Lori L. Taylor

Abstract

Society clearly benefits when businesses compete. The social benefits of government competition are still being debated, however. A large economics literature has sprung up to explore the premise that governments facing intense competitive pressure behave differently than do governments facing little or no competition. Lori Taylor examines the literature on government size, service quality, and productivity. She concludes that an ill-defined market for government, together with inconsistent and potentially inappropriate measuring sticks, raises the strong possibility that competition has been mismeasured in much of the literature on competition and government. Despite these flaws, the literature strongly supports one striking conclusion--competition improves public schools. Almost across the board, researchers have found that school spending is lower, academic outcomes are better, and school district efficiency is higher where parents have more choice of educational provider. Furthermore, competitive benefits appear regardless of whether the competitor is a private school or another public school.

Suggested Citation

  • Lori L. Taylor, 2000. "The evidence on government competition," Economic and Financial Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, issue Q2, pages 2-10.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedder:y:2000:i:q2:p:2-10
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grossman, Philip J & West, Edwin G, 1994. "Federalism and the Growth of Government Revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(1-2), pages 19-32, April.
    2. Mark Schneider, 1989. "Intercity competition and the size of the local public work force," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 253-265, December.
    3. Edwin West, 1992. "Federalism and the Growth of Government Revisited," Carleton Economic Papers 92-06, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised Apr 1994.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fox, William F. & Gurley, Tami, 2006. "Will consolidation improve sub-national governments ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3913, The World Bank.
    2. Laurie Bates & Rexford Santerre, 2006. "Leviathan in the Crosshairs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 133-145, April.
    3. Cowden, Birton & Tang, Jintong, 2022. "Institutional entrepreneurial orientation: Beyond setting the rules of the game for blockchain technology," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
    4. Timothy J. Gronberg & Dennis W. Jansen & Mustafa U. Karakaplan & Lori L. Taylor, 2015. "School district consolidation: Market concentration and the scale‐efficiency tradeoff," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(2), pages 580-597, October.
    5. Baocheng He & Jiawei Wang & Jiaoyang Wang & Kun Wang, 2018. "The Impact of Government Competition on Regional R&D Efficiency: Does Legal Environment Matter in China’s Innovation System?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(12), pages 1-18, November.

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