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Do Penalties And Enforcement Measures Make Taxpayers More Compliant? The View Of Australian Tax Evaders

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  • Dr Ken Devos

    ()
    (Senior Lecturer in Taxation Law Department of Business Law and Taxation, Monash University, Clayton Campus, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia)

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    Abstract

    The tax compliance literature indicates that many factors, including, economic, social, psychological and demographic, impact upon the compliance behaviour of individual taxpayers. This study explores the relationship, if any, that exists between selected tax compliance and demographic variables and the compliance behaviour of Australian individual tax evaders. The study employed a mixed method research approach comprising both a survey and interviews. The findings revealed that tax law enforcement measures and to a lesser degree penalties and detection, did impact upon the compliance behaviour of tax evaders. The studys results provide useful information for tax authorities and have implications for tax policy development.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Far East Research Centre in its journal Far East Journal of Psychology and Business.

    Volume (Year): 12 No 1 Paper 1 July (2013)
    Issue (Month): 1 (July)
    Pages: 1-9

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    Handle: RePEc:fej:articl:v:12a:y:2013:i:1:p:1-9

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    Web page: http://www.fareastjournals.com/journal_detail.aspx?jid=18

    Related research

    Keywords: Tax; Penalty; Tax Evaders; Enforcement; Taxation.;

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    References

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    1. Grasmick, Harold G. & Scott, Wilbur J., 1982. "Tax evasion and mechanisms of social control: A comparison with grand and petty theft," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 213-230, September.
    2. Frey, Bruno S. & Torgler, Benno, 2006. "Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt3rd3f982, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    3. Joel Slemrod, 2007. "Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 25-48, Winter.
    4. Wallschutzky, I. G., 1984. "Possible causes of tax evasion," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 371-384, December.
    5. Alm, James & McClelland, Gary H. & Schulze, William D., 1992. "Why do people pay taxes?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 21-38, June.
    6. Alm, James & Cronshaw, Mark B & McKee, Michael, 1993. "Tax Compliance with Endogenous Audit Selection Rules," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 27-45.
    7. Cowell, Frank A, 1985. "The Economic Analysis of Tax Evasion," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(3), pages 163-93, September.
    8. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    9. Hite, Peggy A., 1988. "An examination of the impact of subject selection on hypothetical and self-reported taxpayer noncompliance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 445-466, December.
    10. Hasseldine, D John & Kaplan, Steven E, 1992. "The Effect of Different Sanction Communications on Hypothetical Taxpayer Compliance: Policy Implications from New Zealand," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 47(1), pages 45-60.
    11. Wenzel, Michael, 2005. "Motivation or rationalisation? Causal relations between ethics, norms and tax compliance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 491-508, August.
    12. Josef Falkinger & Herbert Walther, 1991. "Rewards Versus Penalties: on a New Policy against Tax Evasion," Public Finance Review, , vol. 19(1), pages 67-79, January.
    13. James, Simon & Alley, Clinton, 2002. "Tax compliance, self-assessment and tax administration," MPRA Paper 26906, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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