Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Price dynamics in a two-period reputation model

Contents:

Author Info

  • Dragan Filipovich

    (El Colegio de México)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper looks at the time-path of prices in a two-period modified version of the reputation model of Milgrom and Roberts(10) in which a non-standard price signalling stage game is substituted for the entry-deterrence game those authors work with. It shows that prices may rise or fall from one period to the next. Also, it shows that “bonding’’ is not possible in this environment.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://codex.colmex.mx:8991/exlibris/aleph/a18_1/apache_media/LBBLB9UXEXB9GINF58AN5U46CPA56T.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos in its journal Estudios Económicos.

    Volume (Year): 16 (2001)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 185-201

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:emx:esteco:v:16:y:2001:i:2:p:185-201

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.colmex.mx/centros/cee/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sobel, Joel., 1985. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Working Papers 565, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    2. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
    3. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
    4. David Kreps & Paul Milgrom & John Roberts & Bob Wilson, 2010. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 239, David K. Levine.
    5. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August.
    6. Mark N. Hertzendorf, 1993. "I'm Not a High-Quality Firm -- But I Play One on TV," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(2), pages 236-247, Summer.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:emx:esteco:v:16:y:2001:i:2:p:185-201. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rocío Contreras).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.