Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Why the Transition from Communism Is So Difficult

Contents:

Author Info

  • Mancur Olson, Jr.

    (University of Maryland)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    After the defeat of fascism, there were economic miracles, but after the collapse of communism, economic performance has been poor. This address develops a theory of power that explains this difference and other puzzles. When those with power have an encompassing stake in society, they have an incentive to make it productive. When those with power have only a narrow interest in society, their incentive is to seek redistributions without concern for social costs. After fascism, the encompassing interests of majorities prevailed, whereas after communism narrow interests, such as large and uneconomic state enterprises, have had disproportionate political influence.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://college.holycross.edu/RePEc/eej/Archive/Volume21/V21N4P437_461.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Eastern Economic Association in its journal Eastern Economic Journal.

    Volume (Year): 21 (1995)
    Issue (Month): 4 (Fall)
    Pages: 437-461

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:21:y:1995:i:4:p:437-461

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: c/o Dr. Alexandre Olbrecht, The Anisfield School of Business 205, Ramapo College, 505 Ramapo Valley Road, Ramapo, New Jersey 07430, USA
    Phone: (201) 684-7346
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.ramapo.edu/eea/journal.html
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Communism;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Nikolay Nenovsky & Yorgos Rizopoulos, 2004. "Measuring the Institutional Change of the Monetary Regime in a Political Economy Perspective (Groups of interest and monetary variables during the Currency Board introduction in Bulgaria)," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp732, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    2. Bilin Neyaptý, 2000. "Central bank Independence and Economic Performance in Eastern Europe," Departmental Working Papers 0007, Bilkent University, Department of Economics.
    3. Koford, Kenneth, 2000. "Citizen restraints on "Leviathan" government: transition politics in Bulgaria," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 307-338, June.
    4. Yorgos Rizopoulos & Nikolay Nenovsky, 2004. "Peut-on mesurer le changement institutionnel du régime monétaire ?," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 75(2), pages 17-36.
    5. Lazarev, Valery & Gregory, Paul, 2003. "Commissars and cars: A case study in the political economy of dictatorship," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 1-19, March.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:21:y:1995:i:4:p:437-461. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Victor Matheson, College of the Holy Cross).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.