Why the Transition from Communism Is So Difficult
AbstractAfter the defeat of fascism, there were economic miracles, but after the collapse of communism, economic performance has been poor. This address develops a theory of power that explains this difference and other puzzles. When those with power have an encompassing stake in society, they have an incentive to make it productive. When those with power have only a narrow interest in society, their incentive is to seek redistributions without concern for social costs. After fascism, the encompassing interests of majorities prevailed, whereas after communism narrow interests, such as large and uneconomic state enterprises, have had disproportionate political influence.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Eastern Economic Association in its journal Eastern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 21 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 (Fall)
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- P21 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
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- Koford, Kenneth, 2000. "Citizen restraints on "Leviathan" government: transition politics in Bulgaria," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 307-338, June.
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