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The technical basis for spectrum rights: Policies to enhance market efficiency

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  • Matheson, Robert
  • Morris, Adele C.

Abstract

This paper describes a conceptual framework to articulate clear rights of access to radio spectrum in a way that would foster an efficient market-based allocation of the resource. In this approach, regulators partition spectrum rights across the dimensions of space, time, frequency, and direction of propagation. They devolve each partition, called a licensed electrospace region (LER), to licensees who may buy, sell, aggregate, and subdivide their LERs at will. All signals outside an LER must have a power level of less than a regulated limit with de minimis exceptions. In addition, even within an LER, transmitter power or field strength must fall below a separate regulator-set level for the band. Licensees may deploy any devices and provide any services that do not violate these rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Matheson, Robert & Morris, Adele C., 2012. "The technical basis for spectrum rights: Policies to enhance market efficiency," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 783-792.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:36:y:2012:i:9:p:783-792
    DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2012.05.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas W. Hazlett & Roberto E. Muñoz, 2009. "A welfare analysis of spectrum allocation policies," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 424-454, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Antonio NICITA & Maria Alessandra ROSSI, 2013. "Spectrum Crunch vs. Spectrum Sharing:Exploring the 'Authorised Shared Access' Model," Communications & Strategies, IDATE, Com&Strat dept., vol. 1(90), pages 17-40, 2nd quart.
    2. de Vries, J. Pierre, 2013. "Optimizing receiver performance using harm claim thresholds," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 757-771.
    3. Chou, Yuntsai, 2014. "A compensation model developed to liberalize spectrum in the G4 era," 20th ITS Biennial Conference, Rio de Janeiro 2014: The Net and the Internet - Emerging Markets and Policies 106897, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    4. Gomez, Marcela M. & Weiss, Martin B.H., 2020. "A comprehensive secondary market model for virtualized wireless connectivity," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(10).
    5. Chou, Yuntsai & Hu, Weimin & Lien, Hsienming, 2015. "A compensation model developed to increase spectrum usage efficiency in the 4G era," 2015 Regional ITS Conference, Los Angeles 2015 146334, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).

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