Financial constraints and continental business groups: Evidence from German Konzerns
Abstract
Using a unique large panel of German firms, we examine whether participation in business groups (Konzerns) reduces the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. The main finding is that the investment sensitivity is significantly reduced for small firms. On the other hand, we do not find clear evidence that medium-sized and large firms participating in Konzerns have different sensitivity compared to that of their stand-alone counterparts. We conclude that the German business model, which embodies key elements of the continental business model, seems to alleviate capital market imperfections for medium-sized and large firms and fails to do so for small firms.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Research in International Business and Finance.
Volume (Year): 23 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 233-242
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Handle: RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:23:y:2009:i:3:p:233-242
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For corrections or technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Jeroen Loos).
Related research
Keywords: Concern Business group Investment Liquidity constraints;Other versions of this item:
- Dorothea Schäfer & Yuriy Gorodnichenko & Oleksandr Talavera, 2006. "Financial Constraints and Continental Business Groups: Evidence from German Konzerns," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 590, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Anaïs Hamelin, 2010. "Is there tunneling in Small Business Groups? Evidence from French SMEs," Working Papers CEB 10-003.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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