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On the formation of international migration policies when no country has an exclusive policy-setting say

Author

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  • Stark, Oded
  • Casarico, Alessandra
  • Devillanova, Carlo
  • Uebelmesser, Silke

Abstract

This paper identifies the migration policies that emerge when both the sending country and the receiving country wield power to set migration quotas, when controlling migration is costly, and when the decision of how much human capital to acquire depends, among other things, on the migration policies. The paper analyzes the endogenous formation of bilateral agreements in the shape of transfers to support migration controls, and in the shape of joint arrangements regarding the migration policy and the cost-sharing of its implementation. The paper shows that in equilibrium both the sending country and the receiving country can participate in setting the migration policy, that bilateral agreements can arise as a welfare-improving mechanism, and that the sending country can gain from migration even when it does not set its preferred policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Stark, Oded & Casarico, Alessandra & Devillanova, Carlo & Uebelmesser, Silke, 2012. "On the formation of international migration policies when no country has an exclusive policy-setting say," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 420-429.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:42:y:2012:i:3:p:420-429
    DOI: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2011.10.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jesus Fernandez-Huertas Moraga, 2008. "A General Model of Bilateral Migration Agreements," Working Papers 360, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Fan, C. Simon & Stark, Oded, 2007. "International migration and "educated unemployment"," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 76-87, May.
    3. Jess Benhabib & Boyan Jovanovic, 2012. "Optimal Migration: A World Perspective," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 321-348, May.
    4. Woodland, Alan D. & Yoshida, Chisato, 2006. "Risk preference, immigration policy and illegal immigration," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 500-513, December.
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    7. Ortega, Francesc, 2005. "Immigration quotas and skill upgrading," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1841-1863, September.
    8. C. Simon Fan & Oded Stark, 2007. "The brain drain, ‘educated unemployment’, human capital formation, and economic betterment1," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 15(4), pages 629-660, October.
    9. Bond, Eric W. & Chen, Tain-Jy, 1987. "The welfare effects of illegal immigration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 315-328, November.
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    11. Oded Stark & C. Simon Fan, 2009. "The Brain Drain, ‘Educated Unemployment’, Human Capital Formation, and Economic Betterment," International Economic Association Series, in: János Kornai & László Mátyás & Gérard Roland (ed.), Corruption, Development and Institutional Design, chapter 7, pages 120-151, Palgrave Macmillan.
    12. Benhabib, Jess, 1996. "On the political economy of immigration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1737-1743, December.
    13. Stark, Oded & Wang, Yong, 2002. "Inducing human capital formation: migration as a substitute for subsidies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 29-46, October.
    14. Facchini, Giovanni & Willmann, Gerald, 2005. "The political economy of international factor mobility," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 201-219, September.
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    16. C. Simon Fan & Oded Stark, 2007. "The brain drain, 'educated unemployment', human capital formation, and economic betterment," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 15, pages 629-660, October.
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    18. Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 258-262, May.
    19. Djajic, Slobodan, 1989. "Skills and the Pattern of Migration: The Role of Qualitative and Quantitative Restrictions on International Labor Mobility," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(4), pages 795-809, November.
    20. Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim & Suwankiri, Benjarong, 2011. "Migration and the Welfare State: Political-Economy Policy Formation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262016109, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Oded Stark & Roman Zakharenko, 2012. "Differential Migration Prospects, Skill Formation, and Welfare," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(4), pages 657-673, September.
    2. Stark, Oded & Byra, Lukasz & Casarico, Alessandra & Uebelmesser, Silke, 2017. "A critical comparison of migration policies: Entry fee versus quota," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 91-107.
    3. Yasin Kerem Gumus, 2015. "What explains differences in countries’ migration policies?," International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science (2147-4478), Center for the Strategic Studies in Business and Finance, vol. 4(1), pages 51-65, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Human capital formation; International migration; Migration policies; Welfare analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • I30 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers

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