Why voters may prefer congested public clubs
AbstractGovernmental facilities for such services as education, health, and transportation are often small, of poor quality, and overcrowded, even when the costs are spread among all taxpayers. We also find that governments may subsidize private facilities providing the same services, or may charge admission fees at public facilities. We explain these phenomena with a model which considers two types of people, rich and poor. A majority consisting of poor people may purposely build small and low quality facilities to discourage use by the rich, thereby lowering taxes. For the same reason, the poor may benefit from an admission fee at public clubs, or even from a subsidy to private clubs they do not use.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.
Volume (Year): 65 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
Other versions of this item:
- Glazer, Amihai & Niskanen, Esko, 2001. "Why voters may prefer congested public clubs," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt2rm6x4kc, University of California Transportation Center.
- Glazer, Amihai & Niskanen, Esko, 1992. "Why voters may prefer congested public clubs," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt16j5s39d, University of California Transportation Center.
- Glazer, Amihai & Niskanen, Esko, 1992. "Why Voters May Prefer Congested Public Clubs," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt9vk9r6zm, University of California Transportation Center.
- Glazer, A. & Niskanen, E., 1990. "Why Voters May Prefer Congested Public Clubs," Papers 90-91-18, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sonstelie, Jon, 1982. "The Welfare Cost of Free Public Schools," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(4), pages 794-808, August.
- Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1989.
"Public Provision Of Private Goods And The Redistribution Of Income,"
36, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1991. "Public Provision of Private Goods and the Redistribution of Income," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 979-84, September.
- Stiglitz, J. E., 1974. "The demand for education in public and private school systems," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 349-385, November.
- Kangsik, Choi, 2011. "Cournot and Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs in a mixed duopoly," MPRA Paper 34100, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Christoph Starke, 2010. "Serving the Many or Serving the Most Needy?," FEMM Working Papers 100002, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
- Zanola, Roberto, 2000. "Public goods versus publicly provided private goods in a two-class economy," POLIS Working Papers 12, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
- Mark Gradstein & Moshe Justman, 1996. "The political economy of mixed public and private schooling: A dynamic analysis," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 297-310, July.
- Kangsik, Choi, 2012. "Cournot and Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs in a mixed duopoly revisited," MPRA Paper 37704, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 28 Mar 2012.
- Steffen Burchhardt & Christoph Starke, 2010. "Target-Group and Quality Decisions of Inequity-Averse Entrepreneurs," FEMM Working Papers 100011, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
- Gradstein, Mark & Justman, Moshe, 2005. "The melting pot and school choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(5-6), pages 871-896, June.
- Christoph Starke, 2012. "Serving the many or serving the most needy?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 365-386, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.