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Pay more or pay less? The impact of controlling shareholders' share pledging on firms' dividend payouts

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  • Xu, Jingjing
  • Huang, Haijie

Abstract

We investigate the relationship between controlling shareholders' share pledging and firms' cash dividend payout policies. Using Chinese A-share market data, we find that firms with share-pledging controlling shareholders pay less cash dividend and this effect is more pronounced among firms with severer agency problems and with weaker internal or outside monitoring. Further, we find that share-pledging firms are inclined to transfer more reserve to common shares, but pay no more stock dividend. Moreover, share pledging firms are associated with more controlling shareholders' expropriation through tunneling. Our combined findings imply that share pledging diminishes controlling shareholders' cash flow right, which aggravates the agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, and thereby negatively impacts firms' cash dividend.

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  • Xu, Jingjing & Huang, Haijie, 2021. "Pay more or pay less? The impact of controlling shareholders' share pledging on firms' dividend payouts," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:65:y:2021:i:c:s0927538x20307058
    DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2020.101493
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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Xiaoqiong & Zhen, Hongxian & Zhu, Feifei, 2023. "Voting with their feet: Controlling shareholders' share pledging and other major shareholders' strategic response," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    2. Michaely, Roni & Qian, Meijun, 2022. "Does stock market liquidity affect dividends?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    3. Chang, Jeffery (Jinfan) & Meng, Qingbin & Ni, Xiaoran, 2022. "A tale of riskiness: The real effects of share pledging on the Chinese stock market," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    4. Qin, Xiao & Wang, Ze, 2023. "Share pledge financing network and systemic risks: Evidence from China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    5. Feng, Yitian, 2023. "Do listed companies fulfill their public commitments? Evidence from the stake-raising commitments of Chinese companies," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    6. Niu, Yuhao & Wang, Sai & Wen, Wen & Li, Sifei, 2023. "Does digital transformation speed up dynamic capital structure adjustment? Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dividend payout; Controlling shareholder; Share pledging;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy

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