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A general model of binary opinions updating

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  • Poindron, Alexis

Abstract

We generalise Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013) to non-conformist societies. Agents in a network are iteratively picking a yes/no opinion, where updating stems from mutual influence. We introduce a notion of groups based on the signs of influence. We examine a few canonical societies, namely, conformist, communitarian, with leaders, with anti-conformist agents. We investigate stability issues. Any kind of opinion updating model can be hosted by our formalism, provided that: (i) alternatives are binary; (ii) opinion adoption is reversible and independent among agents; (iii) the process is Markovian and stationary; (iv) the number of agents is finite; (v) time is discrete.

Suggested Citation

  • Poindron, Alexis, 2021. "A general model of binary opinions updating," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 52-76.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:109:y:2021:i:c:p:52-76
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.10.004
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