Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games
AbstractWe compare the properties of several notions of trembling-hand perfection within classes of compact, metric, and possibly discontinuous games, and show that in the presence of payoff discontinuities, standard notions of trembling-hand perfection fail a weakening of admissibility termed limit admissibility. We also provide conditions ensuring the existence of a limit admissible perfect equilibrium.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4-5 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco
Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium; Limit admissibility; Discontinuous game; Infinite normal-form game; Payoff security;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- KOHLBERG, Elon & MERTENS, Jean-François, .
"On the strategic stability of equilibria,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-716, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean, 2011.
"Approximation Results for Discontinuous Games with an Application to Equilibrium Refinement,"
Departmental Working Papers
201128, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean, 2013. "Approximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 1-26, September.
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean, 2012. "Approximation Results for Discontinuous Games with an Application to Equilibrium Refinement," Departmental Working Papers 201206, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1029-1056, September.
- Monteiro, Paulo Klinger & Page Jr, Frank H., 2007. "Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in compact games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 566-575, May.
- Salonen, Hannu, 1996. "On the Existence of Undominated Nash Equilibria in Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 208-219, June.
- Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol, 2011. "On strategic stability in discontinuous games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 120-123.
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, 2011. "The Existence of Perfect Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 2(3), pages 235-256, July.
- Simon, Leo K & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B, 1995. "Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1421-43, November.
- Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol & McLean, Richard P., 0.
"Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games,"
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean, 2011. "Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games," Departmental Working Papers 201125, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean, 2012. "On Equilibrium Refinement in Supermodular Games," Departmental Working Papers 201207, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.