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On Essential, (Strictly) Perfect Equilibria

Author

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  • Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

    (Rutgers University)

Abstract

It is known that generic games within certain collections of infinite-action normal-form games have only essential equilibria. We point to a difficulty in showing that essential equilibria in generic games are (strictly) perfect, and we identify collections of games whose generic members have only essential and (strictly) perfect equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, 2012. "On Essential, (Strictly) Perfect Equilibria," Departmental Working Papers 201208, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:201208
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol, 2011. "On strategic stability in discontinuous games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 120-123.
    2. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    3. Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean, 2013. "Approximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(1), pages 1-26, September.
    4. Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1029-1056, September.
    5. Yu, Jian, 1999. "Essential equilibria of n-person noncooperative games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 361-372, April.
    6. Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol, 2010. "Essential equilibria in normal-form games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 421-431, January.
    7. Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol, 2011. "Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 531-540.
    8. Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol, 2011. "On the existence of pure-strategy perfect equilibrium in discontinuous games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 23-48, January.
    9. Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, 2011. "The Existence of Perfect Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 2(3), pages 1-22, July.
    10. Simon, Leo K & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B, 1995. "Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1421-1443, November.
    11. Monteiro, Paulo Klinger & Page Jr, Frank H., 2007. "Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in compact games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 566-575, May.
    12. Charalambos D. Aliprantis & Kim C. Border, 2006. "Infinite Dimensional Analysis," Springer Books, Springer, edition 0, number 978-3-540-29587-7, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean, 2015. "On equilibrium refinements in supermodular games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 869-890, November.
    2. Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, 2021. "Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(4), pages 1591-1648, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    infinite normal-form game; equilibrium refinement; essential equilibrium; perfect equilibrium; equilibrium existence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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