Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods
AbstractAbstract This paper shows that the core outcomes of the assignment game coincides with the set of fixed points of a certain function. The lattice property of the core, as well as its non-emptiness, are proved using Tarski's fixed point theorem.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco
Two-sided matching Assignment game Stability Core Lattice structure;
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