IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/marpol/v10y1986i3p215-229.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Local-level management and the commons problem , : A comparative study of Turkish coastal fisheries

Author

Listed:
  • Berkes, Fikret

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Berkes, Fikret, 1986. "Local-level management and the commons problem , : A comparative study of Turkish coastal fisheries," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 215-229, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:10:y:1986:i:3:p:215-229
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0308-597X(86)90054-0
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Varughese, George & Ostrom, Elinor, 2001. "The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in Collective Action: Some Evidence from Community Forestry in Nepal," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 747-765, May.
    2. Kluvánková, Tatiana & Gežík, Veronika, 2016. "Survival of commons? Institutions for robust forest social – ecological systems," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 175-185.
    3. Ruttan, Lore M., 2008. "Economic Heterogeneity and the Commons: Effects on Collective Action and Collective Goods Provisioning," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 969-985, May.
    4. Tenryu, Yohei, 2013. "The Role of the Private Sector under Insecure Property Rights," MPRA Paper 74893, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Oct 2016.
    5. Margaret A. McKean, 1992. "Success on the Commons," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(3), pages 247-281, July.
    6. Paul Seabright, 1993. "Managing Local Commons: Theoretical Issues in Incentive Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 113-134, Fall.
    7. Sara Singleton & Michael Taylor, 1992. "Common Property, Collective Action and Community," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(3), pages 309-324, July.
    8. Marco A. Janssen & Elinor Ostrom, 2008. "TURFS in the lab: Institutional Innovation in Real-Time Dynamic Spatial Commons," Rationality and Society, , vol. 20(4), pages 371-397, November.
    9. Botelho, Anabela & Dinar, Ariel & Pinto, Lígia M. Costa & Rapoport, Amnon, 2015. "Promoting cooperation in resource dilemmas: Theoretical predictions and experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 40-49.
    10. Loureiro, Maria L. & Dominguez Arcos, Fernando, 2012. "Applying Best–Worst Scaling in a stated preference analysis of forest management programs," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 381-394.
    11. Baland, Jean-Marie & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2003. "Economics of common property management regimes," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 127-190, Elsevier.
    12. Carmen Pedroza-Gutiérrez & Jorge A López-Rocha, 2021. "Ungovernable systems: The strength of informal institutions in the sea cucumber fishery in Yucatan, Mexico," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(3), pages 1-22, March.
    13. Yohei Tenryu, 2017. "The role of the private sector under insecure property rights," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 64(3), pages 285-311, September.
    14. Stallman, Heidi R., 2011. "Ecosystem services in agriculture: Determining suitability for provision by collective management," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 131-139.
    15. Waichman, Israel & Blanckenburg, Korbinian von, 2020. "Is there no “I” in “Team”? Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect in a Cournot competition experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    16. Anabela Botelho & Ariel Dinar & Lígia Costa Pinto & Amnon Rapoport, 2013. "Linking Appropriation of Common Resources and Provision of Public Goods Decreases Rate of Destruction of the Commons," NIMA Working Papers 50, Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada (NIMA), Universidade do Minho.
    17. Ezzat Elokda & Saverio Bolognani & Andrea Censi & Florian Dorfler & Emilio Frazzoli, 2022. "A self-contained karma economy for the dynamic allocation of common resources," Papers 2207.00495, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
    18. Hanna, Susan S., 1997. "The new frontier of American fisheries governance," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 221-233, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:10:y:1986:i:3:p:215-229. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.