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Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms for Reliability in the Integrated European Electricity Market: Effects on Welfare and Distribution through 2023

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  • Traber, Thure

Abstract

A reduced attractiveness of investments in reliable fossil power plants in liberalized markets on the background of a transition towards renewable energies has brought a discussion on capacity policies to Europe. I develop a partial equilibrium model to compare effects of three polar capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRMs) based on the assumption that a CRM is indicated. A strategic reserve (SR) policy with administratively set capacity targets, a capacity market (CM) based on public procurement, and a decentralized reserve market with the obligation of generators to finance reserves in relation to their peak supply (RM). Substantial differences of policies arise across countries and regarding consumers and producers due to power plant structures. By 2023, we find the decentralized RM to induce least pronounced distributional effects and only modest welfare reductions, while SR and CM induce higher losses. In the longer term until 2033, welfare results differ less pronounced, although the RM is most friendly to consumers. A robust policy conclusion has to pay attention to further aspects concerning the environment and technological developments.

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  • Traber, Thure, 2017. "Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms for Reliability in the Integrated European Electricity Market: Effects on Welfare and Distribution through 2023," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 1-14.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:46:y:2017:i:c:p:1-14
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2016.10.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Bhagwat, Pradyumna C. & Iychettira, Kaveri K. & Richstein, Jörn C. & Chappin, Emile J.L. & De Vries, Laurens J., 2017. "The effectiveness of capacity markets in the presence of a high portfolio share of renewable energy sources," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 76-91.
    3. Khan, Agha Salman M. & Verzijlbergh, Remco A. & Sakinci, Ozgur Can & De Vries, Laurens J., 2018. "How do demand response and electrical energy storage affect (the need for) a capacity market?," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 39-62.
    4. Lukas Block & Bastian Westbrock, 2022. "Capacity investments in a competitive energy market," Working Papers Dissertations 95, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    5. Milstein, Irena & Tishler, Asher & Woo, Chi-Keung, 2022. "Wholesale electricity market economics of solar generation in Israel," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    6. Bublitz, Andreas & Keles, Dogan & Zimmermann, Florian & Fraunholz, Christoph & Fichtner, Wolf, 2018. "A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Working Paper Series in Production and Energy 27, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Institute for Industrial Production (IIP).
    7. Bublitz, Andreas & Keles, Dogan & Zimmermann, Florian & Fraunholz, Christoph & Fichtner, Wolf, 2019. "A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1059-1078.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electricity market; Capacity mechanism; Investment model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis

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