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What are consumers willing to pay for a broad network health plan?: Evidence from covered California

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  • Drake, Coleman

Abstract

Health Insurance Marketplaces have received considerable attention for their narrow network health plans. Yet, little is known about consumer tastes for network breadth and how they affect plan selection. I estimate demand for health plans in California’s Marketplace, Covered California. Using 2017 individual enrollment data and provider network directories, I develop a geospatial measure of network breadth that reflects the physical locations of households and network providers. I find that households are sensitive to network breath in their plan choices. Mean willingness to pay for a broad network plan relative to a narrow network plan, defined as a two standard deviation, 17.44 percentage point increase in network breadth, is $45.83 in post-subsidy monthly premiums. Variation in WTP indicates a selection mechanism exists whereby older households sort into broader network plans. I also find that households are highly premium sensitive, which may be a result of plan standardization in Covered California.

Suggested Citation

  • Drake, Coleman, 2019. "What are consumers willing to pay for a broad network health plan?: Evidence from covered California," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 63-77.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:65:y:2019:i:c:p:63-77
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.12.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Evan Saltzman, 2021. "Managing adverse selection: underinsurance versus underenrollment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(2), pages 359-381, June.
    2. Drake, Coleman & Ryan, Conor & Dowd, Bryan, 2022. "Sources of inertia in the individual health insurance market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    3. Pietro Tebaldi & Alexander Torgovitsky & Hanbin Yang, 2023. "Nonparametric Estimates of Demand in the California Health Insurance Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(1), pages 107-146, January.
    4. Jonas R. Jahnert & Hato Schmeiser & Florian Schreiber, 2022. "Pricing strategies in the German term life insurance market: An empirical analysis," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 25(1), pages 19-34, April.
    5. Maria Polyakova & Stephen P. Ryan, 2019. "Subsidy Targeting with Market Power," NBER Working Papers 26367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Eli Liebman & Matthew T. Panhans, 2021. "Why do narrow network plans cost less?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(10), pages 2437-2451, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ACA; Health insurance marketplace; Covered California; Discrete choice; Health insurance; Provider network;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities

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