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Controlling stockholders and the disciplinary role of corporate payout policy: a study of the Times Mirror Company

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Author Info
DeAngelo, Harry
DeAngelo, Linda
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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBX-408C9X0-1/2/05b995c5d38d17d3e7d12fbcf3c84f81
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

Volume (Year): 56 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 153-207
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:56:y:2000:i:2:p:153-207

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576

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  1. Anderson, Ronald W. & Hamadi, Malika, 2009. "Large powerful shareholders and cash holding," CEPR Discussion Papers 7291, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Paolo Santella & Giulia Paone & Carlo Drago, 2005. "How Independent are Independent Directors? The Case of Italy," Finance 0512026, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Paolo, Santella & Carlo, Drago & Giulia, Paone, 2007. "Who cares about Director Independence?," MPRA Paper 2288, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-30.

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