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What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design

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  • Ashlagi, Itai
  • Nikzad, Afshin

Abstract

Many school districts apply the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm after ties among students are resolved exogenously. This paper compares two common tie-breaking rules: one in which all schools use a common lottery, and one in which each school uses a separate independent lottery. We identify the balance between supply and demand as the determining factor in this comparison.

Suggested Citation

  • Ashlagi, Itai & Nikzad, Afshin, 2020. "What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:190:y:2020:i:c:s0022053120301137
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105120
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    10. Boris Pittel, 2019. "On Likely Solutions of the Stable Matching Problem with Unequal Numbers of Men and Women," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 44(1), pages 122-146, February.
    11. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1954-1978, December.
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    14. Ashlagi, Itai & Nikzad, Afshin & Romm, Assaf, 2019. "Assigning more students to their top choices: A comparison of tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 167-187.
    15. Carroll, Gabriel, 2014. "A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 163-177.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Amel Awadelkarim & Arjun Seshadri & Itai Ashlagi & Irene Lo & Johan Ugander, 2023. "Rank-heterogeneous Preference Models for School Choice," Papers 2306.01801, arXiv.org.
    2. André Veski & Péter Biró & Kaire Põder & Triin Lauri, 2017. "Efficiency and fair access in Kindergarten allocation policy design," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 2(1), pages 57-104, December.
    3. Felipe Arteaga & Adam J Kapor & Christopher A Neilson & Seth D Zimmerman, 2022. "Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 137(3), pages 1791-1848.
    4. Estelle Cantillon & Li Chen & Juan S. Pereyra, 2022. "Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?," Papers 2212.02881, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
    5. Estelle Cantillon & Li Chen & Juan Sebastian Pereyra Barreiro, 2022. "Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off ?," Working Papers ECARES 2022-39, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    6. Christopher Neilson & Felipe Arteaga & Adam Kapor & Seth Zimmerman, 2021. "Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School ChoiceSmart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice," Working Papers 650, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    7. Ethem Akyol, 2022. "Ex-Ante Welfare Superiority of the Boston Mechanism Over the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 1189-1220, December.
    8. Max Kapur, 2021. "Characterizing nonatomic admissions markets," Papers 2107.01340, arXiv.org.
    9. Cho, Wonki Jo & Hafalir, Isa E. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2022. "Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    10. Itai Feigenbaum & Yash Kanoria & Irene Lo & Jay Sethuraman, 2020. "Dynamic Matching in School Choice: Efficient Seat Reassignment After Late Cancellations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 5341-5361, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market design; School choice; Matching;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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