Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result
AbstractThis paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivalent for the problem of allocating students to schools in which students have strict preferences and the schools are indifferent. In proving this result, a new approach is introduced, that simplifies and unifies all the known equivalence results in the house allocation literature. Along the way, two new mechanisms---Partitioned Random Priority and Partitioned Random Endowment---are introduced for the house allocation problem. These mechanisms generalize widely studied mechanisms for the house allocation problem and may be appropriate for the many-to-one setting such as the school choice problem.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Econometric Society in its journal Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 6 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://econtheory.org
Matching; random assignment;
Other versions of this item:
- Parag A. Pathak & Jay Sethuraman, 2010. "Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result," NBER Working Papers 16140, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2005.
"The New York City High School Match,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 364-367, May.
- Ünver, M. Utku & Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu & Hashimoto, Tadashi & Hirata, Daisuke, 2014. "Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
- Aytek Erdil, 2013. "Strategy-Proof Stochastic Assignment," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1333, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Umut M. Dur & Scott Duke Kominers & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "The Demise of Walk Zones in Boston: Priorities vs. Precedence in School Choice," NBER Working Papers 18981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kesten, Onur & Ünver, M. Utku, 0. "A theory of school choice lotteries," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1954-78, December.
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