Missing elements in US financial reform: A Kübler-Ross interpretation of the inadequacy of the Dodd-Frank Act
AbstractThe success of any treatment plan depends on how completely the problems it targets have been diagnosed. The precrisis bubble in securitization can be traced to incentive conflict that allows national safety nets to subsidize leveraged risk-taking. Safety-net subsidies encouraged regulation-induced innovations that enabled firms to take hard-to-monitor risks and to make themselves politically, administratively, and economically difficult for government officials to fail and unwind.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Banking & Finance.
Volume (Year): 36 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf
Dodd-Frank Act; Financial reform; Safety-net subsidies; Financial crises; Regulatory capture;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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