Towards a theory of accounting regulation: A discussion of the politics of disclosure regulation along the economic cycle
AbstractThe paper by Bertomeu and Magee (this issue) endogenizes accounting regulation by a majority-seeking regulator and examines how the economic cycle affects mandatory reporting quality. This discussion puts the paper in the broader context of a theory of accounting regulation. Then, it focuses on crucial assumptions, including the exogenous evolution of the economy, the role of market frictions, the modeling of reporting quality, and the regulatory process and regulatory cycles, and provides suggestions for future research.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Accounting and Economics.
Volume (Year): 52 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Accounting standards; Regulation; Standard setting; Institutions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Accounting
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