Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

From low-quality reporting to financial crises: Politics of disclosure regulation along the economic cycle

Contents:

Author Info

  • Bertomeu, Jeremy
  • Magee, Robert P.
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper examines how financial reporting regulations affect, and respond to, macroeconomic cycles by exploring a positive framework in which regulators subject to political pressures respond to cyclical demands by borrowers and lenders. We establish that, as economic conditions initially decline, political power shifts toward interest groups favoring less financial transparency. What follows is a counter-cyclical increase in economic activity, as more non-reporting loans are financed, possibly coincidental with more aggregate uncertainty. During a recession, reporting quality is increased, potentially causing a crisis-like adjustment of economic activity to the cycle. We also discuss implications for event studies, bank lobbying, mark-to-market and cost of capital.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410111000619
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Accounting and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 52 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 209-227

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:52:y:2011:i:2:p:209-227

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jae

    Related research

    Keywords: Business cycle; Regulation; Political economy; Credit crisis; Debt contracting; Accounting standards; Lobbying;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Lohse, Tim & Thomann, Christian, 2014. "Are Bad Times Good News for the Securities and Exchange Commission?," Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation 371, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies.
    2. Allen, Abigail & Ramanna, Karthik, 2013. "Towards an understanding of the role of standard setters in standard setting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 66-90.
    3. Roland Königsgruber, 2013. "Expertise-based lobbying and accounting regulation," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 1009-1025, November.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:52:y:2011:i:2:p:209-227. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.