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Why do some school-based management reforms survive while others are reversed? The cases of Honduras and Guatemala

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  • Ganimian, Alejandro J.

Abstract

In the 1990s, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras enacted school-based management (SBM) reforms that allowed communities to make key decisions about their schools that were previously reserved for state-appointed officials. Yet, these reforms have recently begun to slide back. What explains this trend toward reform reversal? This paper argues that two factors determine the likelihood of the reversal of an SBM program: the scope of the reform and the level of national investment in it. Using the cases of Honduras and Guatemala, I contend these two factors determine the extent to which an SBM reform is vulnerable to events that can bring about its termination, such as changes in government, union strength, or parental pressure.

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  • Ganimian, Alejandro J., 2016. "Why do some school-based management reforms survive while others are reversed? The cases of Honduras and Guatemala," International Journal of Educational Development, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 33-46.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:injoed:v:47:y:2016:i:c:p:33-46
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijedudev.2015.12.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Hossain, Mobarak, 2021. "Does greater community involvement mean more parent-teacher interaction? Evidence from seven developing countries," International Journal of Educational Development, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    2. Okitsu, Taeko & Edwards, D. Brent, 2017. "Policy promise and the reality of community involvement in school-based management in Zambia: Can the rural poor hold schools and teachers to account?," International Journal of Educational Development, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 28-41.

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