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Political Predation And Economic Development

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Author Info
JEAN PAUL AZAM
ROBERT BATES
BRUNO BIAIS

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Abstract

We analyze a game between citizens and governments, whose type (benevolent or predatory) is unknown to the public. Opportunistic governments mix between predation and restraint. As long as restraint is observed, political expectations improve, people enter the modern sector, and the economy grows. Once there is predation, the reputation of the government is ruined and the economy collapses. If citizens are unable to overthrow this government, the collapse is durable. Otherwise, a new government is drawn and the economy can rebound. Consistent with stylized facts, equilibrium political and economic histories are random, unstable, and exhibit long-term divergence. Copyright 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00345.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Economics & Politics.

Volume (Year): 21 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (07)
Pages: 255-277
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Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:21:y:2009:i:2:p:255-277

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Goriaev, Alexei P. & Sonin, Konstantin, 2005. "Is Political Risk Company-Specific? The Market Side of the Yukos Affair," CEPR Discussion Papers 5076, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Besley, Timothy J. & Kudamatsu, Masayuki, 2007. "Making Autocracy Work," CEPR Discussion Papers 6371, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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