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Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism

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Author Info
Sobel, Joel

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-458NM4B-R/2/d98e51c8be204bb457bd26ff14861161
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 37 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 196-215
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:37:y:2001:i:1:p:196-215

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Eiichi Miyagawa, 2002. "Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions," Discussion Papers 0102-16, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "Strategy-Proof Risk Sharing," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200305, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Pivato, Marcus, 2007. "Twofold Optimality of the Relative Utilitarian Bargaining Solution," MPRA Paper 2637, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Pivato, Marcus, 2006. "Approximate implementation of Relative Utilitarianism via Groves-Clarke pivotal voting with virtual money," MPRA Paper 627, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-7-9.

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