IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v62y2008i2p329-347.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Multiperson utility

Author

Listed:
  • Baucells, Manel
  • Shapley, Lloyd S.

Abstract

We approach the problem of preference aggregation by endowing both individuals and coalitions with partially-ordered or incomplete preferences for decision under risk. Restricting attention to the case of complete individual preferences, and assuming complete preferences for some pairs of agents (interpersonal comparisons of utility units), we discover that the Extended Pareto Rule (if two disjoint coalitions A and B prefer x to y, then so does the coalition A[union or logical sum]B) imposes a "no arbitrage" condition in the terms of utility comparison between agents. Furthermore, if all the individuals and pairs have complete preferences and certain non-degeneracy conditions are met, then we witness the emergence of a complete preference ordering for coalitions of all sizes. The corresponding utilities are a weighted sum of individual utilities, with the n-1 independent weights obtained from the preferences of n-1 pairs forming a spanning tree in the group.

Suggested Citation

  • Baucells, Manel & Shapley, Lloyd S., 2008. "Multiperson utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 329-347, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:62:y:2008:i:2:p:329-347
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899-8256(07)00105-4
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Saposnik, Rubin, 1975. "Social Choice with Continuous Expression of Individual Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(4), pages 683-690, July.
    2. Kalai, Ehud & Schmeidler, David, 1977. "Aggregation Procedure for Cardinal Preferences: A Formulation and Proof of Samuelson's Impossibility Conjecture," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(6), pages 1431-1438, September.
    3. Amrita Dhillon & Jean-Francois Mertens, 1999. "Relative Utilitarianism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 471-498, May.
    4. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "Interpersonal Aggregation and Partial Comparability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(3), pages 393-409, May.
    5. Peter A. Diamond, 1967. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparison of Utility: Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75, pages 765-765.
    6. Schmeidler, David, 1969. "Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders and Incomplete Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(4), pages 578-585, October.
    7. Dubra, Juan & Maccheroni, Fabio & Ok, Efe A., 2004. "Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 118-133, March.
    8. Costis Skiadas, 1997. "Conditioning and Aggregation of Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 347-368, March.
    9. Luca Rigotti & Chris Shannon, 2005. "Uncertainty and Risk in Financial Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 203-243, January.
    10. Marcus Fleming, 1952. "A Cardinal Concept of Welfare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 66(3), pages 366-384.
    11. James S. Dyer & Rakesh K. Sarin, 1979. "Group Preference Aggregation Rules Based on Strength of Preference," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(9), pages 822-832, September.
    12. Fishburn, Peter C, 1973. "A Mixture-Set Axiomatization of Conditional Subjective Expected Utility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(1), pages 1-25, January.
    13. Frank DeMeyer & Charles R. Plott, 1971. "A Welfare Function Using "Relative Intensity" of Preference," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 85(1), pages 179-186.
    14. John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 309-309.
    15. Vind, Karl, 2000. "von Neumann Morgenstern preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 109-122, February.
    16. Juan Dubra & Fabio Maccheroni & Efe A. Ok, 2004. "Expected Utility Without the Completeness Axiom," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm404, Yale School of Management.
    17. Edi Karni, 2003. "Impartiality and interpersonal comparisons of variations in well-being," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(1), pages 95-111, August.
    18. Machina, Mark J, 1982. ""Expected Utility" Analysis without the Independence Axiom," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 277-323, March.
    19. Sobel, Joel, 2001. "Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 196-215, October.
    20. Luce, R Duncan & Krantz, David H, 1971. "Conditional Expected Utility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(2), pages 253-271, March.
    21. Manel Baucells & Rakesh K. Sarin, 2003. "Group Decisions with Multiple Criteria," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(8), pages 1105-1118, August.
    22. Baucells, Manel & Shapley, Lloyd S., 2008. "Multiperson utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 329-347, March.
    23. Truman F. Bewley, 1986. "Knightian Decision Theory: Part 1," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 807, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    24. Sen, Amartya K, 1977. "On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1539-1572, October.
    25. Amrita Dhillon, 1998. "Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(4), pages 521-542.
    26. Rakesh Kumar Sarin, 1982. "Strength of Preference and Risky Choice," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 30(5), pages 982-997, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Baucells, Manel & Samet, Dov, 2018. "Coalition preferences with individual prospects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 585-591.
    2. Hamed Hamze Bajgiran & Houman Owhadi, 2021. "Aggregation of Models, Choices, Beliefs, and Preferences," Papers 2111.11630, arXiv.org.
    3. Robert G. Chambers & Tigran Melkonyan & John Quiggin, 2022. "Incomplete preferences, willingness to pay, and willingness to accept," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(3), pages 727-761, October.
    4. McCarthy, David & Mikkola, Kalle & Thomas, Teruji, 2020. "Utilitarianism with and without expected utility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 77-113.
    5. Thibault Gajdos & Feriel Kandil, 2008. "The ignorant observer," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(2), pages 193-232, August.
    6. Pivato, Marcus, 2009. "Social choice with approximate interpersonal comparisons of well-being," MPRA Paper 17060, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Eric Danan, 2021. "Partial utilitarianism," Working Papers hal-03327900, HAL.
    8. Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2017. "Stochastic Dominance Analysis Without the Independence Axiom," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(4), pages 1097-1109, April.
    9. Marcus Pivato, 2009. "Twofold optimality of the relative utilitarian bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(1), pages 79-92, January.
    10. SPRUMONT, Yves, 2009. "Relative Egalitarianism and Related Criteria," Cahiers de recherche 2009-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    11. Lopomo, Giuseppe & Rigotti, Luca & Shannon, Chris, 2022. "Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    12. Danan, Eric & Gajdos, Thibault & Tallon, Jean-Marc, 2013. "Aggregating sets of von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 663-688.
    13. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gevers, Louis, 2002. "Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 10, pages 459-541, Elsevier.
    14. Pivato, Marcus, 2010. "Risky social choice with approximate interpersonal comparisons of well-being," MPRA Paper 25222, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. McCarthy, David & Mikkola, Kalle & Thomas, Teruji, 2016. "Utilitarianism with and without expected utility," MPRA Paper 72578, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Yves Sprumont, 2013. "On relative egalitarianism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1015-1032, April.
    17. Evren, Özgür, 2014. "Scalarization methods and expected multi-utility representations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 30-63.
    18. Marcus Pivato, 2013. "Risky social choice with incomplete or noisy interpersonal comparisons of well-being," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 123-139, January.
    19. Omer F. Baris, 2018. "Timing effect in bargaining and ex ante efficiency of the relative utilitarian solution," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 84(4), pages 547-556, June.
    20. Kraus, Alan & Sagi, Jacob S., 2006. "Inter-temporal preference for flexibility and risky choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 698-709, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:62:y:2008:i:2:p:329-347. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.