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The political economy of timber taxation: The case of Ghana

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  • Hansen, Christian P.
  • Lund, Jens F.

Abstract

We analyze the political economy of timber taxation in Ghana. Our results show that politicians maintain control over allocation of timber rights, that taxation constitutes an insignificant share of the value of the timber resource, and that the distribution of timber revenues hardly contributes towards the official forest policy justifications. Our analysis suggests that politicians wield control over rent-seeking opportunities that are exchanged for political support through patron-client networks. This speaks to a larger literature on why governments waste resources and constitutes an argument for increased attention to the political economy underlying natural resource policies.

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  • Hansen, Christian P. & Lund, Jens F., 2011. "The political economy of timber taxation: The case of Ghana," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(8), pages 630-641, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:forpol:v:13:y:2011:i:8:p:630-641
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    Cited by:

    1. Pouliot, Mariève & Treue, Thorsten, 2013. "Rural People’s Reliance on Forests and the Non-Forest Environment in West Africa: Evidence from Ghana and Burkina Faso," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 180-193.
    2. Hansen, Christian P. & Rutt, Rebecca & Acheampong, Emmanuel, 2018. "‘Experimental’ or business as usual? Implementing the European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Voluntary Partnership Agreement in Ghana," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 75-82.
    3. Ameyaw, Joana & Arts, Bas & Wals, Arjen, 2016. "Challenges to responsible forest governance in Ghana and its implications for professional education," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 78-87.
    4. Carlsen, Kirsten & Hansen, Christian Pilegaard & Lund, Jens Friis, 2012. "Factors affecting certification uptake — Perspectives from the timber industry in Ghana," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 83-92.
    5. Hajjar, Reem, 2015. "Advancing small-scale forestry under FLEGT and REDD in Ghana," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 12-20.
    6. Ramcilovic-Suominen, Sabaheta & Epstein, Graham, 2015. "The impacts of deterrence, social norms and legitimacy on forest rule compliance in Ghana," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 10-20.

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