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Asymmetric information in late 19th century cooperative insurance societies

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  • Gottlieb, Daniel

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Explorations in Economic History.

Volume (Year): 44 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 270-292

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Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:44:y:2007:i:2:p:270-292

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622830

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References

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  1. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 379-409, March.
  2. Di Matteo, Livio & Herbert Emery, J. C., 2002. "Wealth and the demand for life insurance: evidence from Ontario, 1892," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 446-469, October.
  3. Ghatak, M. & Guinnane, T.W., 1998. "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice," Papers 791, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  4. Finkelstein, Amy, 2004. "Minimum standards, insurance regulation and adverse selection: evidence from the Medigap market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2515-2547, December.
  5. David M. Cutler & Sarah Reber, 1996. "Paying for Health Insurance: The Tradeoff between Competition and Adverse Selection," NBER Working Papers 5796, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Fishback, Price V. & Kantor, Shawn Everett, 1992. "“Square Deal” or Raw Deal? Market Compensation for Workplace Disamenities, 1884–1903," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(04), pages 826-848, December.
  7. Gourieroux, Christian & Monfort, Alain & Renault, Eric & Trognon, Alain, 1987. "Generalised residuals," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-2), pages 5-32.
  8. Kantor, Shawn Everett & Fishback, Price V, 1996. "Precautionary Saving, Insurance, and the Origins of Workers' Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(2), pages 419-42, April.
  9. Dora L. Costa, 1995. "The Political Economy of State Provided Health Insurance in the Progressive Era: Evidence from California," NBER Working Papers 5328, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Jonathan Gruber, 2000. "Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1162-1183, December.
  11. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 219-55, April.
  12. Thomasson, Melissa A., 2004. "Early evidence of an adverse selection death spiral? The case of Blue Cross and Blue Shield," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 313-328, October.
  13. Guinnane, T. & Banerjee, A. & Besley, T., 1993. "Thy Neighbor's Keeper: the Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test," Papers 705, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  14. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  15. Emery, J. C. Herbert, 1996. "Risky Business? Nonactuarial Pricing Practices and the Financial Viability of Fraternal Sickness Insurers," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 195-226, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Timothy W. Guinnane & Jochen Streb, 2010. "Moral Hazard in a Mutual Health-Insurance System: German Knappschaften, 1867–1914," Ruhr Economic Papers 0163, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.

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