Risky Business? Nonactuarial Pricing Practices and the Financial Viability of Fraternal Sickness Insurers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Explorations in Economic History.
Volume (Year): 33 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622830
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