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Empowered communities: The rise of community choice aggregation in the United States

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  • O'Shaughnessy, Eric
  • Heeter, Jenny
  • Gattaciecca, Julien
  • Sauer, Jenny
  • Trumbull, Kelly
  • Chen, Emily

Abstract

Community choice aggregation (CCA) is an emerging model of energy procurement that allows local governmental entities to procure electricity on behalf of retail electricity customers. Through CCA, local governments can control local electricity portfolios while investor-owned utilities remain responsible for transmission and distribution. In this article, we use a combination of publicly-available data, data obtained directly from CCAs, and stakeholder interviews to explore the rise of CCAs, the current and potential future impacts of CCAs on demand for renewable energy, and the factors that will determine future CCA expansion. We estimate that CCAs procured about 42 million megawatt-hours of electricity on behalf of about 5 million customers in the United States in 2017. We estimate that CCAs already procure about 8.9 million megawatt-hours more renewable energy than required by state mandates, and that CCAs could procure as much as 28.9 million megawatt-hours of voluntary renewable energy if the CCA model is permitted in more states. The ongoing expansion of CCAs could significantly affect electricity markets, electricity portfolios, and the future role of utilities. We explore various challenges associated with the further expansion of CCAs.

Suggested Citation

  • O'Shaughnessy, Eric & Heeter, Jenny & Gattaciecca, Julien & Sauer, Jenny & Trumbull, Kelly & Chen, Emily, 2019. "Empowered communities: The rise of community choice aggregation in the United States," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 1110-1119.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:132:y:2019:i:c:p:1110-1119
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2019.07.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Fikru, Mahelet G. & Canfield, Casey, 2022. "Demand for renewable energy via green electricity versus solar installation in Community Choice Aggregation," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 769-779.
    3. Hirsh Bar Gai, Dor & Shittu, Ekundayo & Attanasio, Donna & Weigelt, Carmen & LeBlanc, Saniya & Dehghanian, Payman & Sklar, Scott, 2021. "Examining community solar programs to understand accessibility and investment: Evidence from the U.S," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    4. Agustin J. Ros, 2020. "Does electricity competition work for residential consumers? Evidence from demand models for default and competitive residential electricity services," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 1-32, August.
    5. John Byrne & Peter Lund & Job Taminiau, 2022. "Rapid climate transformation requires transformative policy and science thinking—An editorial essay," Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Energy and Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(1), January.
    6. Sean F Kennedy & Bailey Rosen, 2021. "The rise of community choice aggregation and its implications for California’s energy transition: A preliminary assessment," Energy & Environment, , vol. 32(2), pages 262-280, March.

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