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Critical infrastructure protection using secrecy – A discrete simultaneous game

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  • Zhang, Chi
  • Ramirez-Marquez, José Emmanuel
  • Wang, Jianhui

Abstract

In this research, critical infrastructure protection against intentional attacks is modeled as a discrete simultaneous game between the protector and the attacker, to model the situation that both players keep the information of their resource allocation secret. We prove that keeping the information regarding protection strategies secret can obtain a better effect of critical infrastructure protection than truthfully disclosing it. Solving a game theoretic problem, even in the case of two players, has been known to be intractable. To deal with this complexity, after proving that pure-strategy Nash equilibrium solutions do not exist for the proposed simultaneous game, a new approach is proposed to identify its mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium solution.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhang, Chi & Ramirez-Marquez, José Emmanuel & Wang, Jianhui, 2015. "Critical infrastructure protection using secrecy – A discrete simultaneous game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 242(1), pages 212-221.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:242:y:2015:i:1:p:212-221
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2014.10.001
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    Cited by:

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    7. Wu, Di & Liu, Xiang-dong & Yan, Xiang-bin & Peng, Rui & Li, Gang, 2019. "Equilibrium analysis of bitcoin block withholding attack: A generalized model," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 318-328.
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    10. Li, Qing & Li, Mingchu & Tian, Yuan & Gan, Jianyuan, 2023. "A risk-averse tri-level stochastic model for locating and recovering facilities against attacks in an uncertain environment," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    11. Li, Yulong & Zhang, Chi & Jia, Chuanzhou & Li, Xiaodong & Zhu, Yimin, 2019. "Joint optimization of workforce scheduling and routing for restoring a disrupted critical infrastructure," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    12. Wang, Shuliang & Sun, Jingya & Zhang, Jianhua & Dong, Qiqi & Gu, Xifeng & Chen, Chen, 2023. "Attack-Defense game analysis of critical infrastructure network based on Cournot model with fixed operating nodes," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 40(C).
    13. Di Wu & Xiangbin Yan & Rui Peng & Shaomin Wu, 2020. "Optimal defence-attack strategies between one defender and two attackers," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 71(11), pages 1830-1846, November.
    14. Li, Yapeng & Qiao, Shun & Deng, Ye & Wu, Jun, 2019. "Stackelberg game in critical infrastructures from a network science perspective," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 521(C), pages 705-714.
    15. Qingqing Zhai & Rui Peng & Jun Zhuang, 2020. "Defender–Attacker Games with Asymmetric Player Utilities," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(2), pages 408-420, February.
    16. Sachuer Bao & Chi Zhang & Min Ouyang & Lixin Miao, 2019. "An integrated tri-level model for enhancing the resilience of facilities against intentional attacks," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 283(1), pages 87-117, December.
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    18. Ye, Zhi-Sheng & Peng, Rui & Wang, Wenbin, 2017. "Defense and attack of performance-sharing common bus systemsAuthor-Name: Zhai, Qingqing," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 256(3), pages 962-975.
    19. González-Ortega, Jorge & Ríos Insua, David & Cano, Javier, 2019. "Adversarial risk analysis for bi-agent influence diagrams: An algorithmic approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 273(3), pages 1085-1096.
    20. Zhang, Jing & Zhuang, Jun, 2019. "Modeling a multi-target attacker-defender game with multiple attack types," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 465-475.
    21. Jiang, J. & Liu, X., 2018. "Multi-objective Stackelberg game model for water supply networks against interdictions with incomplete information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 266(3), pages 920-933.

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