IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/reensy/v112y2013icp176-186.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Is it wise to leave some false targets unprotected?

Author

Listed:
  • Levitin, Gregory
  • Hausken, Kjell

Abstract

The paper considers a system consisting of genuine elements and false targets that cannot be distinguished by the attacker's observation. The false targets can be destroyed with much less effort than the genuine elements. To enhance the attack efficiency the attacker uses a double attack strategy in which it tries first to eliminate with optimal effort as many false targets as possible in the first attack and then distributes its entire remaining resource among all surviving targets in the second attack. It is assumed that the defender can protect some of the false targets whereas the attacker attacks all targets it can observe. In both attacks the attacking resource is distributed evenly among the attacked targets. The model for evaluating the system vulnerability in the double attack is suggested for parallel and series systems. This model considers the cases of perfect and imperfect detection of the targets destroyed in the first attack. The defense strategy is analyzed based on a two period minmax game. The methodology of optimal attack and defense strategies analysis is demonstrated. In is shown that under certain conditions (high contest intensity, scarce defense resource, low FT cost, high probability of wrong identification of destroyed targets by the attacker) the defender benefits from protecting a subset of the false targets. An algorithm for determining the optimal number of false targets that should be protected is suggested.

Suggested Citation

  • Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2013. "Is it wise to leave some false targets unprotected?," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 176-186.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:reensy:v:112:y:2013:i:c:p:176-186
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2012.11.015
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0951832012002451
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ress.2012.11.015?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kjell Hausken, 2011. "Protecting complex infrastructures against multiple strategic attackers," International Journal of Systems Science, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(1), pages 11-29.
    2. Hausken, Kjell & Levitin, Gregory, 2009. "Protection vs. false targets in series systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 94(5), pages 973-981.
    3. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
    4. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
    5. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2009. "Intelligence and impact contests in systems with redundancy, false targets, and partial protection," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 94(12), pages 1927-1941.
    6. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2011. "Is it wise to protect false targets?," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 96(12), pages 1647-1656.
    7. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    8. Jun Zhuang & Vicki M. Bier, 2007. "Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters---Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 55(5), pages 976-991, October.
    9. Zhuang, Jun & Bier, Vicki M. & Alagoz, Oguzhan, 2010. "Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 203(2), pages 409-418, June.
    10. John Cadigan & Pamela Schmitt, 2010. "Strategic entry deterrence and terrorism: Theory and experimental evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(1), pages 3-22, April.
    11. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2009. "False targets vs. redundancy in homogeneous parallel systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 588-595.
    12. Gregory Levitin & Kjell Hausken, 2009. "Intelligence and Impact Contests in Systems with Fake Targets," Defense & Security Analysis, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(2), pages 157-173, June.
    13. Hausken, Kjell, 2010. "Defense and attack of complex and dependent systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 29-42.
    14. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2009. "False targets efficiency in defense strategy," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 194(1), pages 155-162, April.
    15. Fonseca, Miguel A., 2009. "An experimental investigation of asymmetric contests," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 582-591, September.
    16. John Cadigan, 2007. "Two-State Team Rent-Seeking: Experimental Analysis," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(1), pages 85-103, July.
    17. Wilfred Amaldoss & Amnon Rapoport, 2005. "Collaborative Product and Market Development: Theoretical Implications and Experimental Evidence," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(3), pages 396-414, February.
    18. William Stein & Amnon Rapoport, 2005. "Symmetric two-stage contests with budget constraints," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 309-328, September.
    19. Hao Jia, 2012. "Contests with the Probability of a Draw: A Stochastic Foundation," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 88(282), pages 391-406, September.
    20. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
    21. Hausken, Kjell & Levitin, Gregory, 2009. "Minmax defense strategy for complex multi-state systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 577-587.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gao, Kaiye & Yan, Xiangbin & Liu, Xiang-dong & Peng, Rui, 2019. "Object defence of a single object with preventive strike of random effect," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 209-219.
    2. Zhang, Xiaoxiong & Ye, Yanqing & Tan, Yuejin, 2020. "How to protect a genuine target against an attacker trying to detect false targets," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 553(C).
    3. Levitin, Gregory & Xing, Liudong & Xiang, Yanping, 2020. "Optimal early warning defense of N-version programming service against co-resident attacks in cloud system," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    4. Kjell Hausken, 2014. "Choosing what to protect when attacker resources and asset valuations are uncertain," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 24(3), pages 23-44.
    5. Ramirez-Marquez, José Emmanuel & Li, Qing, 2018. "Locating and protecting facilities from intentional attacks using secrecyAuthor-Name: Zhang, Chi," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 51-62.
    6. Olive Emil Wetter & Valentino Wüthrich, 2015. "“What is dear to you?” Survey of beliefs regarding protection of critical infrastructure against terrorism," Defense & Security Analysis, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(3), pages 185-198, September.
    7. Levitin, Gregory & Xing, Liudong & Dai, Yuanshun, 2022. "Co-residence based data theft game in cloud system with virtual machine replication and cancellation," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    8. Levitin, Gregory & Xing, Liudong & Xiang, Yanping, 2021. "Minimization of Expected User Losses Considering Co-resident Attacks in Cloud System with Task Replication and Cancellation," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    9. Xing, Liudong & Levitin, Gregory, 2017. "Balancing theft and corruption threats by data partition in cloud system with independent server protection," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 248-254.
    10. Chen, Die & Xu, Maochao & Shi, Weidong, 2018. "Defending a cyber system with early warning mechanism," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 224-234.
    11. Wu, Di & Yan, Xiangbin & Peng, Rui & Wu, Shaomin, 2020. "Risk-attitude-based defense strategy considering proactive strike, preventive strike and imperfect false targets," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    12. Peng, Rui & Xiao, Hui & Guo, Jianjun & Lin, Chen, 2020. "Defending a parallel system against a strategic attacker with redundancy, protection and disinformation," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    13. Wu, Di & Xiao, Hui & Peng, Rui, 2018. "Object defense with preventive strike and false targets," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 76-80.
    14. Zhang, Xiaoxiong & Ding, Song & Ge, Bingfeng & Xia, Boyuan & Pedrycz, Witold, 2021. "Resource allocation among multiple targets for a defender-attacker game with false targets consideration," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    15. Gao, Xing & Zhong, Weijun & Mei, Shue, 2013. "A game-theory approach to configuration of detection software with decision errors," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 35-43.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ramirez-Marquez, Jose E. & Rocco S, Claudio M. & Levitin, Gregory, 2009. "Optimal protection of general source–sink networks via evolutionary techniques," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 94(10), pages 1676-1684.
    2. Qingqing Zhai & Rui Peng & Jun Zhuang, 2020. "Defender–Attacker Games with Asymmetric Player Utilities," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(2), pages 408-420, February.
    3. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2011. "Is it wise to protect false targets?," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 96(12), pages 1647-1656.
    4. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2012. "Strategic Defense And Attack For Series And Parallel Reliability Systems: Comment," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(5), pages 507-515, October.
    5. Peng, Rui & Xiao, Hui & Guo, Jianjun & Lin, Chen, 2020. "Defending a parallel system against a strategic attacker with redundancy, protection and disinformation," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    6. Peng, R. & Zhai, Q.Q. & Levitin, G., 2016. "Defending a single object against an attacker trying to detect a subset of false targets," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 137-147.
    7. Chen, Shun & Zhao, Xudong & Chen, Zhilong & Hou, Benwei & Wu, Yipeng, 2022. "A game-theoretic method to optimize allocation of defensive resource to protect urban water treatment plants against physical attacks," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 36(C).
    8. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2009. "Intelligence and impact contests in systems with redundancy, false targets, and partial protection," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 94(12), pages 1927-1941.
    9. Ramirez-Marquez, Jose E. & Rocco, Claudio M. & Levitin, Gregory, 2011. "Optimal network protection against diverse interdictor strategies," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 374-382.
    10. Bricha, Naji & Nourelfath, Mustapha, 2013. "Critical supply network protection against intentional attacks: A game-theoretical model," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-10.
    11. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2010. "Influence of attacker's target recognition ability on defense strategy in homogeneous parallel systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 95(5), pages 565-572.
    12. Kjell Hausken, 2012. "Game Theoretic Analysis of Standby Systems," Chapters, in: Yair Holtzman (ed.), Advanced Topics in Applied Operations Management, IntechOpen.
    13. Zhang, Chi & Ramirez-Marquez, José Emmanuel & Wang, Jianhui, 2015. "Critical infrastructure protection using secrecy – A discrete simultaneous game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 242(1), pages 212-221.
    14. Kjell Hausken & Jun Zhuang, 2011. "Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T -Period Game," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 8(1), pages 46-70, March.
    15. Bricha, Naji & Nourelfath, Mustapha, 2014. "Extra-capacity versus protection for supply networks under attack," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 185-196.
    16. Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2010. "Separation in homogeneous systems with independent identical elements," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 203(3), pages 625-634, June.
    17. Zhang, Xiaoxiong & Ding, Song & Ge, Bingfeng & Xia, Boyuan & Pedrycz, Witold, 2021. "Resource allocation among multiple targets for a defender-attacker game with false targets consideration," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    18. Hausken, Kjell & Bier, Vicki M., 2011. "Defending against multiple different attackers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 211(2), pages 370-384, June.
    19. G Levitin & K Hausken, 2010. "Defence and attack of systems with variable attacker system structure detection probability," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 61(1), pages 124-133, January.
    20. Hausken, Kjell, 2017. "Defense and attack for interdependent systems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 256(2), pages 582-591.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:reensy:v:112:y:2013:i:c:p:176-186. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/reliability-engineering-and-system-safety .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.