Secrecy And Deception At Equilibrium, With Applications To Anti-Terrorism Resource Allocation
AbstractIn this work, we develop a game-theoretic model for whether and how a first mover should disclose her resource allocation. Our model allows us to explore whether the first mover should disclose correct information about her resource allocation, incorrect information, or no information. Although we study secrecy and deception specifically in the homeland-security context where the first mover is assumed to be the defender, our work can also provide insights in other contexts, such as business competition.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Defence and Peace Economics.
Volume (Year): 22 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/GDPE20
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Wang, Xiaofang & Zhuang, Jun, 2011. "Balancing congestion and security in the presence of strategic applicants with private information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 212(1), pages 100-111, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.