The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
AbstractIn the college admission problem, we show that the student-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for students if colleges' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand. We also show that both of these properties are important for the result.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 99 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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